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Home Office has become a necessity nowadays, as it is part of the business continuity 
plan for many companies and organizations worldwide, ever since the COVID-19 
outbreak made its presence in 2020. Even though it is not new as a concept, it has had 
a rapid growth, and it is now heavily used even within business areas that preferred to 
have all employees working from corporate offices. The oil and gas industry is such an 
example, since companies with a presence in that area, would always prefer to have 
their employees on-site, rather than working remotely. The aggressive introduction of 
“Work from Home” solutions though, comes with significant cyber risks that are not to 
be taken lightly. 
The aim of this thesis is to analyze a set of common risk assessment methodologies that 
are used in information security and test their effectiveness in terms of assessing 
cybersecurity risks related to the home office implementation in the oil and gas 
industry. The methodologies under investigation are IRAM2, ISO 27005:2018, Octave 
Allegro, FAIR and NIST SP800-30. According to the findings, there are specific 
strengths and limitations that risk analysts, decision-makers and other relevant 
stakeholders need to consider while using one or more of these methods for this specific 
use-case. The most important factor is time, which causes significant impediments for 
all involved parties and limits the options that can be considered, for reacting to the 
rationality of the situation. There are also more generic learnings though which are 
applicable even if companies had more time for properly assessing cyber risks before 
introducing remote worker solutions. The outcome of the research leans towards the 
use of two or more different risk assessment methodologies, which can be combined 
depending on the company’s needs and the project in scope. The learnings of this thesis 
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It is beyond doubt that the event that scarved its dominant mark more than any other in 
the year 2020, is the COVID-19 pandemic. It all started in Wuhan China, where the 
first cases were reported and identified as “viral pneumonia”. Two weeks later, the first 
epidemiological alert was raised by PAHO/AMRO and a few days later, it was first 
announced that human-to-human transmission is possible (WHO, 2020). Officially, the 
virus appeared in Europe, France on the 24th of January 2020, however latter reports 
indicate that the first case was a patient that was treated in the same country on the 27th 
of December in 2019 (BBC, 2020). The virus quickly spread across the continent, and 
it also started having a vivid presence in the American continent as well. The results 
have been devastating so far in many different aspects. From a humanitarian 
perspective, 110 million of cases have been identified, and almost 2.5 million deaths 
have been reported until mid-February 2021 (WHO, 2021). The impact on global 
economy is equally overwhelming, mainly due to the global trading collapse (WTO, 
2020), the rise of unemployment (Tennant, 2020) and the investments hesitance 
(Jackson, et al., 2020, p. 30). 
As a response to the outbreak, many governments worldwide took urgent measures in 
an effort to limit the virus spread, and to support their health system. One of the 
measures that was introduced globally, was to shut down most public and private sector 
business for a period of time, so that people can remain isolated at home, hence 
drastically reducing the chances of having infected people transmitting the virus to 
healthy ones. This measure though had a significant impact on private sector companies 
/ organizations, since they could no longer operate properly which resulted in heavy 
financial losses. 
As a proactive (and in certain cases as a reactive) measure, many companies, regardless 
of their size, started looking into options that could potentially ensure business 
continuity to a large scale through the pandemic. The most popular of those measures, 
was to introduce “Home Office” as a method for having their employees working 
remotely from home by using digital means such as a company-provided or personal 
PC / laptop. Even though home office is not new as a concept, it has never been used 
in such a large scale. 
Naturally though, the “Home Office” approach is not suitable for all business sectors. 
For example, quite often, the nature of the work requires the physical presence of an 
employee in the company premises. Another example is a company being hesitant to 
expose digital services on the internet for facilitating remote employees, due to the fear 
of having those services and the information they expose, compromised by malicious 
users. Both of those two used cases are applicable to the oil & gas industry, which 
traditionally prefers having employees in-house doing the required tasks. Due to the 
pandemic though, the industry was forced to adapt to the new standards, and digital 
remote workers have now become a reality for many oil & gas organizations. 
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The decision making, as well as the transition period and methods, were not the same 
for all companies. Some of them might have chosen to pro-actively test scenarios where 
they would have to close their offices and have most of their employees working 
remotely, due to a number of potential root causes they may have thought. Other 
organizations might have considered home office in a much smaller scale, and some 
other may have not even thought of the possibility of such a scenario. It is safe to assume 
though that most (if not all) oil & gas companies that enabled WFH (Work from Home) 
methods, must have done research and evaluation on the related risks, the chances of 
them occurring and their potential impact. 
 
1.2. Main objectives & research questions 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate a set of common cyber security risk assessment 
methods in relation to the “Home Office” situation that has emerged ever since the 
COVID-19 outbreak. The focus of the thesis will be the oil & gas sector, and the 
challenges it faces due to its unique characteristics. The end goal is to provide 
suggestions to risk analysts and decision-makers within the industry, on how to 
approach similar use-cases in the future. The suggestions and findings are based on risk 
science data and the conducted analysis. The following research questions need to be 
addressed as basis before providing suggestions / recommendations: 
1. What are the most common / widely used risk assessment methods related to 
cyber security risks, and what are their main characteristics?  
2. What are the advantages and disadvantages of each of those risk assessment 
methods from a risk science point of view?  
3. How effective is each risk assessment method for evaluating the risks of the 
“Work from Home” situation in the oil & gas industry, in both planned and 
unplanned (such as the COVID-19 use-case) scenarios? 
  
1.3. Limitations and considerations 
 
Prior to conducting the scientific analysis of this thesis, certain limitations must be 
highlighted. The conducted analysis is focused on the home office cyber security risks 
only. This does not mean that the only risks related to working from home are 
originating from the cyber threats landscape. Certain other risks that come into the 
picture, can be the physical and mental health of the employee. 
Another limitation is in relevance to identifying the most common risk assessment 
methodologies in today’s industry. For the scope of this thesis, five have been selected, 
based on literature review, as well as data gathered from the interview. 
Moreover, the result of this research also depends on quality of the data that is to be 
gathered from Equinor ASA, and more specifically from the company’s cyber security 
and risk management experts’ input. The interview information is used as support case 
study for providing a real-world example from the industry, however other 
3 
 
organizations in the business sector might have dealt with the home office situation in 
a different way. Furthermore, it should be stated that the author has relatively limited 
knowledge on information security science. 
An important consideration is the partial usage and reflection of the author’s personal 
judgement, while comparing risk assessment methodologies and producing findings 
and suggestions. This comes as a logical inference and it is heavily based on the analysis 
and review of relevant literature and interview data presented in this thesis.  
 
1.4. Thesis structure 
 
The first part of the thesis is dedicated to establishing a theoretical framework. More 
specifically, it provides a basic analysis on the risk concept and its description, as well 
as on risk management / risk analysis fundamentals, and the risk assessment process. 
As a follow up, a detailed background section establishes a clear understanding of 
certain elements, such as a short oil & gas business sector description, the unique 
characteristics of that business area in relation to remote workforce, past use-cases that 
provide insight on remote digital workers in the industry, and the most common cyber 
threats that emerge for energy organizations using “Work from Home” techniques for 
ensuring business continuity during the pandemic. 
The next chapter is focused on the research methodology. It provides details on the 
methods that have been chosen, as well as arguments for supporting these choices. 
Moving to the next chapter, the research shifts focus on cyber security risk assessment 
methods. More specifically, it provides a list of the most common cyber security risk 
assessment types, utilized in the oil & gas industry, as well as an overview of their 
characteristics, and an analysis of advantages and disadvantages associated with each 
of the listed methods. 
A support case study from Equinor ASA, a major oil & gas company, follows, 
providing information and real data on how an enterprise-level organization dealt 
implemented home office solutions for its employees, and how it dealt with the “Work 
from Home” risks. 
The data presented in the theory and context sections, as well as the risk assessment 
methodologies presentation and the case study, are used as a basis to conduct a review 
for strengths and limitations for the pre-selected risk assessment methodologies, in the 
scenario of using them for analyzing risks related to working from home solutions, from 
an oil &  gas industry perspective. 
The final part of the thesis is devoted to discussions on the research evaluations, as well 
as on the scientific findings. It also provides recommendations and suggestions to the 
risk analysis experts, as well as future research proposals that could evolve and/or 






The theory presented in this chapter is the basis of understanding the core content and 
the scientific breakdown of the thesis. More specifically, the first subchapter provides 
an analysis on “risk concept” fundamentals, as well as the “risk description” of the 
scientific term. Furthermore, it contains a basic explanation of “vulnerability”, a term 
widely used in risk science. The following subchapter contains a discussion on risk 
management, risk analysis and risk assessment methods, while the last one provides a 
generic analysis on cyber security basics. 
 
2.1. Risk concept, risk description & vulnerability 
 
Over the past few decades, many efforts have been made to establish a specific 
definition on risk that is both understandable and acceptable from the global scientific 
community. To address this challenge, the Society of Risk Analysis (SRA) has 
introduced an authoritative glossary of risk, which consists of seven qualitative 
definitions (Aven, 2020, p. 58). According to them, risk is: 
• the possibility of an unfortunate occurrence. 
• the potential for realization of unwanted, negative consequences of an event. 
• exposure to a proposition (e.g. the occurrence of a loss) of which one is 
uncertain. 
• the consequences of the activity and associated uncertainties. 
• uncertainty about and severity of the consequences of an activity with respect 
to something that humans value. 
• the occurrences of some specified consequences of the activity and associated 
uncertainties. 
• the deviation from a reference value and associated uncertainties. 
Aven’s approach is aligned with SRA’s definitions. According to him, the risk concept 
consists of two main features, Consequences (C) and Uncertainty (U). The former refers 
to something that humans value, while the latter refers to the uncertainty 
(possibility/potential). More specifically, the risk (A, C, U) of an event (A) will lead to 
consequences (C), which are characterized by uncertainties (U), since no one is fully 
aware of what will occur in the future  (Aven, 2020, p. 58). 
This definition can be further elaborated by using home office in the oil and gas industry 
as an example. The activity considered in this thesis is “Work from Home” for oil and 
gas companies. risk analysts, decision-makers, and other relevant stakeholders need to 
investigate the potential consequences of this activity in terms of cyber security events 
(A) and their potential consequences/impact (C). There is uncertainty (U) 
characterizing both (A) and (C), which implies to a condition of risk, where risk is 
understood as (A, C, U).  
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In order to be able to manage risk, it is important to have the ability to describe it and/or 
to measure it. According to Aven, the risk description can be expressed by the following 
concept: 
Risk description= (C’, Q, K) 
where (C’) are the specified consequences, (Q) is the measurement of uncertainty 
(typically measured using probability (P)), and (K) is the background knowledge on 
which (C’) and (Q) are based on. Another way of describing risk is (A’, C’, Q’, K), 
where A’ references specified undesirable events (Aven, 2020, pp. 60-62).  
Moreover, Aven inaugurates “Vulnerability” into the risk concept fundamentals.  
Vulnerability, is the risk conditional on the occurrence of an event (A), and it is 
described as the combination of consequences and the associated uncertainty given an 
event (Aven, 2015, p. 19). By using the appropriate symbols, the risk can be defined 
as: threats, uncertainties (A, U) + vulnerability (C’, U| A). Thus, vulnerability 
description is the following: (C’, Q, K | A) (Aven, 2015, p. 19). 
 
2.2. Risk management 
 
Nowadays, it is widely accepted from the global market that exploitation of new 
opportunities imposes risks, since it is something that cannot be eliminated. Therefore, 
modern organizations and business sectors in general, choose to manage risk instead. 
risk management as a definition, contains all of the activities required with the purpose 
to manage risk (Aven & Vinnem, 2007, p. 1). Aven states that risk management is about 
balancing development and exploring opportunities on one hand, and protection 
avoiding losses, disasters and accidents on the other (Aven & Vinnem, 2007, p. 2). SRA 
offers a similar terminology, since it defines it as the activities to handle risk such as 
prevention, mitigation, adaptation or sharing (SRA, 2018). According to SRA, risk 
management also includes potential compromises between cost and benefit of risk 
deductions, as well as the option of accepting some risks as tolerable. ISO 31000 
describes it as a set of coordinated activities that aim to direct and control an 
organization in terms of risk (ISO 31000:2018, 2018).  
Aven claims that most organizations worldwide choose to divide risk management into 
three categories, strategic, financial and operational (Aven, 2015, pp. 4-5). 
1. The strategic risk refers to risks where the consequences are mainly originating 
from mergers, acquisitions, laws and/or regulations, labor market, technology, 
competition and political conditions. 
2. The financial risk alludes to risks where the consequences are related to the 
global market. Potential factors (amongst others) could be stock prices, interest 
rates, foreign exchange rates, or commodity prices. 
3. The operational risk denotes risks where the consequences are a result of safety 




The risk management process involves many steps / phases. According to ISO 
31000:2018, it includes establishing the scope, context and criteria, the risk assessment 
phase which includes risk identification, risk analysis and evaluation, the risk treatment 
phase, communication and consultation, monitoring and review, as well as recording 
and reporting. Risk analysis is considered to be the central part of this process (ISO 
31000:2018, 2018). 
 
Figure 1 – ISO 31000:2018 Risk Management Process 
 
2.3. Risk analysis 
 
Risk analysis aims to describe risk and to present an informative risk picture with the 
use of different methods (Aven, 2015, p. 1). There are three main categories of risk 
analysis methods depending on their simplicity and complexity, and two different 
types, qualitative or quantitative. The following table provides an overview of the risk 
analysis categories, as well as a core description for each (Aven, 2015, p. 2): 





Qualitative Simplified risk analysis is an informal procedure 
mainly utilizing brainstorming sessions and group 
discussions for establishing the risk picture. Risk is 






Standard risk analysis is a more formalized 
procedure compared to the simplified one, since it 
utilizes risk analysis methods such as Hazard and 
Operability study (HAZOP) or coarse risk analysis. 





Model-based risk analysis utilizes more complex, 
quantitative techniques to calculate risk. 
Table 1 – Main Categories of risk analysis methods 
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According to Aven, there are multiple risk analysis models, however the most common 
structure contains three main phases, which are “Planning”, “Risk Assessment 
(execution)”, and “Risk Treatment (use)” (Aven, 2015, p. 5). The planning phase 
includes problem definition, information gathering, organizing the whole work and 
selection of the risk method. The risk assessment is the main part of the risk analysis 
which aims to identify the initiating events (threats, hazards, opportunities), and to 
conduct a cause and consequence analysis in order to establish a risk picture. The next 
phase is the comparison of all alternatives, as well as identification and assessment of 
measures. The last part is the management review and judgement with the final goal to 
make decisions for the risk treatment. The following figure provides a high overview 
of risk analysis (Aven, 2015, p. 6): 
 
Figure 2 – Risk Analysis Process Overview 
 
2.4. The risk assessment process 
 
According to Aven, the risk assessment process is one of the core components of risk 
analysis (Figure 2). He defines risk assessment as the systematic process during which 
risk sources, threats, hazards and opportunities are discovered. Moreover, during this 
process, the relevant involved parties can obtain a better understanding of how such 
events can occur and what are the potential consequences. It is also used as a mean for 
risk and uncertainties expression and representation, as well as for highlighting the 
gravity of each of the identified risks by using relevant criteria (Aven, 2020, p. 87). 
According to the ISO 31000:2018 risk management process (Figure 1, p.9), the risk 
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assessment phase relates the above steps through risk identification, risk analysis and 
risk evaluation. 
The first and most critical task of risk analysis is the identification of initiating events. 
The goal of this task is to identify risk sources, threats, hazards and opportunities that 
potentially may occur. It is of the outmost importance to execute it efficiently, since 
involved parties will not have the ability to reduce consequences of events that have 
not been identified. Therefore, this step needs to be carried out in a structured and 
systematic manner with the involvement of competent resources. During this task, 
various and suitable methods for each project can be used such as: FMEA (Failure 
modes and effects analysis), HAZOP (Hazard and operability study), SWIFT 
(Structured what-if technique). All these methods are based on structured 
brainstorming, during which experts use means such as checklists and guidewords 
(Aven, 2015, p. 38). 
Cause Analysis follows as an equally critical task, during which experts are searching 
for the causes (the causal factors) that will lead to the occurrence of a pre-identified 
event. For the purpose of the cause analysis task, the involved parties are using different 
methods and techniques such as brainstorming, event tree analysis or Bayesian 
networks. In order to achieve a solid result, it is mandatory to thoroughly examine the 
system knowledge. Moreover, in addition to the main cause analysis, some sub-risk 
analysis tasks may follow for each of the risks found (Aven, 2015, pp. 39-40). 
The consequence analysis utilization targets the discovery of possible consequences for 
every initiating event. The most common methods used are Event tree analysis (ETA) 
and Fault tree analysis (FTA). 
The combination from the cause and consequence analysis provides insights in order to 
establish the risk picture. According to Aven, this picture covers the risk description 
(A’, C’, Q’, K), where (Q’) refers to probabilities (P) and SoK (strength of knowledge 
assessment). The risk picture should cover the following aspects: 
• Predictions of the quantities the experts are interested in (e.g. number of 
fatalities, costs)  
• Probability distributions (e.g. related to costs and number of fatalities)  
• Strength of knowledge  
• Manageability factors    
One simple and understandable way to present the risk picture is the use of risk matrices 
(table 2). They present risk based on probabilities and consequences. Risk science 
experts should be aware though that the use of this tool has some limitations. Therefore, 
both dimensions should be followed by the background knowledge (K), and more 
specifically by the strength of this knowledge (SoK), which in turn can be judged as 
weak or strong depending on special circumstances (Aven, 2020, p. 129). The value of 
the strength of knowledge is considered to have an important role in risk picture and 
consequently in supporting decision makers for a better evaluation and treatment of the 























Catastrophic (5) 5 10 15 20 25 
Major (4) 4 8 12 16 20 
Moderate (3) 3 6 9 12 15 
Minor (2) 2 4 6 8 10 
Negligible (1) 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Table 2 – A typical 5x5 risk matrix example (O' Reilly, n.d.) 
 
2.5. Information security & cyber security fundamentals 
 
2.5.1. Information security 
 
A key objective of the thesis is to investigate the effectiveness of common risk 
assessment methods on evaluating cyber risks related to home office for the oil & gas 
industry. It is therefore important to provide a good understanding of what information 
security and cyber security are, since those two terms are very often mistakenly 
conceived as one. According to the Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS), 
“Information security is the protection of information and its critical elements, 
including the systems and hardware that use, store, and transmit that information” 
(Whitmain & Mattord, 2011, p. 8). It includes information security management, 
computer and data security, and network security. Information security is related to both 
physical and digital forms of data.  
Information security management refers to controls that are implemented by an 
organization, in order to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of its data. 
The three latter are also widely known as the “C.I.A.” triangle. 
 
Figure 3 – C.I.A. Triangle / Triad (Devopedia, n.d.) 
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Confidentiality is important because it ensures that the information in scope is only 
available to a set of individuals or systems that should have the authorization to access 
it. In other words, Confidentiality prevents unauthorized access to the information in 
question. The following example highlights its importance, as well as its potential 
consequences: An organizational document contains information on a scientific 
discovery that can give the company an advantage against its competition. A certain 
individual manages to bypass authorization techniques, get a copy of the documents, 
and sell it to competition. Confidentiality is breached, and the result is financial loss for 
the organization that suffered the incident. Another important aspect is controlling 
access on information related to employees, as well as customers who interact with the 
company / organization. Many governments worldwide are forcing organizations and 
companies to follow specific guidelines and protocols for ensuring confidentiality of 
personal data. The European Union for example, has implemented the widely known 
“General Data Protection Regulation” (also known as G.D.P.R.), which is the strongest 
data privacy and security law worldwide (EU, n.d.). The most common techniques used 
for ensuring confidentiality are information classification, secure document storage, 
application of general security policies, and education of information custodians and 
end users (Whitmain & Mattord, 2011, p. 13). For example, many organizations choose 
to classify their digital documents / information with relevant labels, such as “Public”, 
“Internal”, “Restricted” or “Confidential”. This classification follows principles set in 
ISO 27001 and it defines who should have access on the pre-classified digital 
information (Calder & Watkins, 2015, pp. 127-129).   
 
Integrity is an equally important information security pylon. Information has integrity, 
when it is certain that it is whole, complete and uncorrupted or unaltered. If a hacker 
manages to obtain access to sensitive data, it is possible to modify it or delete it, which 
could cause a series of reactions. The following example illustrates and provides a 
better understanding of the importance of integrity: A company uses digital means for 
paying their suppliers. A hacker manages to gain access to their centralized payment 
system where suppliers records are kept, and modifies their bank accounts to 
international ones, owned by him/her. The company will suffer financial damage since 
they will be liable to their suppliers and it will be challenging to trace the illegal 
payments for obtaining their funds back. Hackers are not the only threat against a 
potential data corruption. Whitmain mentions other examples as well, such as 
corruption of data during transmission (Whitmain & Mattord, 2011, p. 15). 
The last pylon of the CIA triangle is Availability. Authorized users and systems must 
have the ability to access the information they seek at all times. The following scenario 
can provide a better understanding of availability: A retail store uses an e-commerce 
platform for selling goods to customers. The platform is hosted on a network secured 
zone, meaning that there are information security mechanisms /technologies in front of 
it, for protecting it against malicious users, and for authenticating customers, as well as 
administrators that operate it and maintain it. If the information security technologies 
malfunction, the e-commerce package is no longer available towards its users, therefore 
the company has a negative financial impact. It is therefore important to ensure the best 
possible uptime.  
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Certain IT security experts tend to expand the classic CIA triangle even further. For 
example, P.W. Singer and Allan Friedman highlight the importance of one more aspect, 
which is Resilience (Singer & Friedman, 2014, p. 35). They describe resilience as a 
key mechanism that safeguards endurance of a system while it faces security threats, 
and therefore prevents a potential system failure. The authors accept the realistic 
assumption that cyber-attacks and/or security incidents can and will eventually happen, 
therefore it is important to ensure that the affected system will continue serving its 
purpose, unaffected from threats. 
 
2.5.2. Cyber security 
 
Cyber security is a part / subset of information security. Usually, the term “Cyber 
Security” refers to the technical means being used for protecting the digital forms of 
data within a company or an organization from threats or vulnerabilities. This comes in 
contrast to “information security”, where the scope is to protect any forms of data, 
digital or even physical. In the modern IT era, most of the information / data within an 
organization, has a digital form, therefore cyber security is a major part of information 
security. The following figure from Dejan Kosutic, reflects the relationship between 
Risk Management, Information Security, Cyber Security, Business Continuity and 
Information Technology (Kosutic, 2016): 
 
 
Figure 4 – Relationship between Risk Management, Information Security, Cyber 
Security, Business Continuity and Information Technology (Kosutic, 2016). 
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2.5.3. Cyber security threats & vulnerabilities 
 
People often mix and/or misunderstand threats and vulnerabilities related to cyber 
security, and they often perceive them as one, which is not a valid fact. According to 
the Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS), a threat is defined as “Any 
circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact organizational operations 
(including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, individuals, 
other organizations, or the Nation through an information system via unauthorized 
access, destruction, disclosure, modification of information, and/or denial of service” 
(CNSS, 2015, p. 122). In a more generic approach, cyber threats are malicious acts that 
aim towards a partial or total compromise of one or more information systems. The 
end-goal of the attacker is to negatively affect aspects related to the CIA triad. There 
are many types of cyber threat actors, and they are often driven by different motivations, 
depending on their origin, motivation, as well as their target. For example, certain 
nations / countries tend to attack other ones, hence motivation is mostly driven by 
geopolitical factors. Cybercriminals are mostly focused on profit, and terrorists from 
ideological violence. The following figure from the Canadian Centre for Cyber 
Security, presents an overview of the most common cyber threat actors, as well as the 




Figure 5 – Cyber Threat Actors and their motives according to the Canadian Centre 




The cyber threat landscape is something dynamic since new threats constantly emerge, 
while some others tend to fade in time and re-surface depending on various 
circumstances. The most common ones nowadays are the following: 
• Social Engineering. Perhaps the most common cyber attack nowadays, is social 
engineering. The term refers to manipulation techniques used from attackers, in 
order to exploit human errors. The end goal is to lead individuals or groups of 
individuals towards personal data exposure such as usernames/passwords, or 
even gaining access to personal systems. A classic example is an attacker calling 
the potential victim after gathering personal information through various 
sources (e.g. social media such as Facebook), imitating to be someone from the 
victim’s bank. The attacker often tries to convince the user that his/her personal 
account has been compromised, and hence personal information is required for 
verifying the victim’s identity and for securing the account again. The panicked 
victim often shares username/password to the attacker; hence the bank account 
credentials are compromised. Another example of social engineering attacks is 
the “Phishing Attack”. The malicious user implements a sophisticated email 
which appears to be coming from a familiar source to the victim (employer, 
bank, etc.). The email contains links, trying to lure him/her into clicking one of 
them. If the victim clicks, a web site opens which appears to be from the familiar 
source, e.g. the victim’s bank. When the user attempts to logon, his/her 
credentials are stolen from the attacker. According to Verizon (one of the largest 
WAN / Internet providers worldwide), social engineering was the technique 
responsible for more than one third of the total breaches that took place in 2020 
(Verizon, 2020, p. 13). 
• Ransomware. Ransomware refers to malicious software that upon its 
deployment in a victim’s system, it targets and encrypts personal files and 
folders, making them completely inaccessible. Once encryption is done, the 
software pops up a message asking the user to do a one-time ransom payment 
to the attacker within a certain amount of time, which is usually 48 – 72 hours. 
If the victim pays the ransom, the attacker shares the decryption password and 
the victim is able to obtain access to the files again. The ransom is usually paid 
with cryptocurrency, since it is nearly impossible for the authorities to trace the 
payment back to the attacker. Ransomware was the third most popular cyber 
threat in 2020 since it was responsible for more than 20% of the total amount of 
breaches during that year (Verizon, 2020, p. 13). 
• Denial of Service (DDoS). The Denial of Service attack mainly aims the 
“Availability” part of the CIA triad. Hackers deploy a massive number of clients 
that they either own, or they have compromised, in order to create many requests 
towards an internet exposed service. The end goal is to flood this service / server 
with requests and make it impossible for clients / customers accessing that 
service to get the information they want. An example could be a government 
internet exposed service that serves public health. The website is designed to 
accept a maximum of 2.000 simultaneous requests. If attackers perform a DDoS 
attack, sending more than 5.000 requests per second, the service will be unable 
to serve the content to valid civilians, and it will eventually crash due to lack of 
resources. According to Help Net Security, more than 4.83 million DDoS 
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attacks occurred during the first half of 2020, which was a 15% increase 
compared to H2 2019 (HelpNetSecurity, 2020). 
• Crypto Jacking. Crypto jacking refers to malicious crypto mining software 
deployed from the attacker in the victim’s system. The end goal is to utilize the 
hardware resources from the victim’s computer for solving complex 
mathematical algorithms, which then lead to crypto coins generation (e.g., 
bitcoin). Crypto jacking is hard to detect since the victim is often unable to 
realize that system resources are over-utilized. The popularity of this attack 
often depends on the crypto coin prices. If the crypto coin market is down, 
crypto jacking is less popular and attackers tend to use other techniques for 
gaining money, such as ransomware. 
• SQL Injection Attacks. SQL injection is a rather old, but still popular cyber 
threat. Many web services rely on SQL databases on the backend, either for 
verifying user credentials, or for providing data towards the clients. System 
owners / administrators might do a mistake leaving a database exposed to 
malicious SQL code. The attacker takes advantage of text input boxes / fields 
within the website, in order to send malicious code to the database. The result 
can be a completely loss of the database, or theft or data. 
 
Vulnerabilities on the other hand refer to certain weaknesses that may exist within an 
IT technology / system which may be exploited from attackers. CNSS defines 
vulnerability as a “Weakness in an information system, system security procedures, 
internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited by a threat source” (CNSS, 
2015, p. 131). Even though vulnerabilities are not the same as threats, there is an 
obvious connection between the two. An attacker may seek a vulnerability within the 
IT infrastructure of a company / organization, which can then be exploited to perform 
a cyber-attack. A few of the most common vulnerabilities nowadays are: 
• Zero-Day Exploits. A zero-day exploit is a cyber-attack that is performed on 
the very same day that a vulnerability is discovered in a system. The 
vulnerability can be software or hardware related. The following example 
demonstrates a potential zero-day exploit. A large organization’s IT 
infrastructure is heavily based on software that exposes a series of web services 
over the internet. A security organization discovers a weakness on that software, 
which can be exploited by attackers, allowing them to gain control over the 
environment. The software vendor is notified on the weakness and releases a 
critical security patch for mitigating the exposure. The organization though 
hesitates to deploy the patch because there is a requirement according to the 
organization’s governing documents, to test patches on Quality Assurance 
systems prior to deploying them in production. An attacker who has the 
technical ability to exploit that weakness, attacks the company’s web services 
and gains control of the environment. The potential impact can be catastrophic 
both from in technological and financial terms. 
• Software Bug. Directly related to the above, a mistake on the programming 
code of software utilized by organizations, can also be catastrophic since in 
many cases, it is malicious users discovering such weaknesses in the software, 
rather than security companies or the software developers themselves. 
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• Unencrypted Data. If data travels within a company’s network or over the 
internet without encryption, it is vulnerable to attacks related to data theft. The 
most common technique used from attackers in such cases is the “Man-In-The-
Middle” attack, where the attacker intercepts the data in the network while it is 
transferred between two peers. 
• Elevated Account Privileges. In most cases, for daily work, user accounts do 
not require elevated or administrator privileges. Certain users choose to have 
constant administrator privileges enabled, leaving their system vulnerable to 
attackers, since a potential credentials theft could allow the malicious user to 

























3. Context description 
 
3.1. Common “Home Office” cyber security risks  
 
Enterprise organizations worldwide traditionally tend to spend a significant amount of 
money for protecting their network perimeter, clients (laptops, workstations, mobile), 
as well as their IT services. The cyber security market grows constantly year by year, 
and it is expected to more than double in size until 2028, reaching an annual revenue of 
366 billion USD (Fortune Business Insights, 2021).  
As an outcome of the COVID-19 pandemic and the large scale of “Home Office” 
policies, many companies had to change their security infrastructure to be able to 
facilitate remote users. This required investments not just in cyber security, but on IT 
in general. Moreover, according to Gartner, companies that have implemented “Work 
from Home” solutions for their employees, intend to continue offering remote work as 
an option even after the pandemic is over, since 82% of them states that it will be 
allowed for employees to work remotely for some time, while 47% of them will allow 
full-time remote work (Gartner, 2020). From a cyber security perspective though, IT 
experts highlighted the fact that multiple risks were created and / or grew due to the 
large scale of remote working. This was expected, since large organizations that would 
not encourage remote work until now, would invest money on setting up strong network 
security perimeters for protecting services, clients and data. According to the CISO 
Benchmark Report of 2020 which was released just before the pandemic, securing 
mobile workers has been a great challenge even post-COVID-19, since 52% of the 
companies that participated in Cisco’s research responded that mobile device security 
is extremely difficult to deal with (Cisco, 2020, p. 14). 
This section highlights the most common cyber security risks related to the global 
growth of the “Home Office” situation, which came as an aftermath of the COVID-19 
virus outbreak (Cisco, 2020; Irwin, 2021; Kastner, 2021). 
 
3.1.1. Phishing emails 
 
Phishing emails fall into the “Social Engineering” threat, and they aim on deceiving the 
victim to perceive them as genuine. They usually contain a link that leads the victim to 
fake websites which appear as real, or they contain a malicious attachment. The end 
goal is to either get the victim’s username and password since the victim might attempt 
to type credentials in the fake website, or to lead the affected user to download some 
type of malware (for example ransomware) or open an attachment which will 
compromise the user’s system. According to Infosecurity Magazine, phishing attacks, 
increased more than 600% in under a month, as soon as companies implemented remote 
work for their employees (Infosecurity Magazine, 2020). The source of information 
came from Barracuda Networks, a cyber security company specialized on threat 
intelligence. The security vendor reported that the phishing email incidents identified 
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were just 137 in January 2020, rising to 1188 in February and more than 9.000 in March. 
Most of the phishing emails had themes related to COVID-19, eventually tricking 
employees into clicking them since they thought they were genuine. 
 
Figure 6 – Phishing Email that appears to originate from WHO (Kaspersly Labs, n.d.) 
 
3.1.2. Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) 
 
BYOD (Bring Your Own Device) refers to the strategy implemented by companies, 
allowing their employees to use their own personal devices (mobile phones, tables, 
laptops, workstations) for accessing company data and/or IT solutions (Gartner, n.d.). 
Since Q1 2020, when the Corona outbreak started, many organizations that shifted to a 
“Work from Home” policy, did not have sufficient resources to equip their employees 
with company-owned devices and/or it was something that would require a significant 
amount of time to do so. Therefore, they chose to deploy remote solutions that would 
allow their employees to use their own equipment, or they would fully or partially fund 
them to buy IT equipment and use it in a “Home Office” setup. BYOD market financial 
forecast reveal that the market will grow significantly over the next few years, due to 
organizations allowing remote work with personal devices (DigitalGuardian, 2020). 
According to IT security experts though, BYOD has cyber security risks related to it, 
and large-scale BYOD policies can be a threat if not designed properly. As reported by 
a poll conducted by Outpost24 amongst 200 security partitioners, more than half of 
them reported that they have little or no visibility on the number of BYOD devices 
connecting into their company’s network and remote solutions (Outpost24, 2020). 
Other significant threats related to the use of personal devices for remote work, are 
weak passwords, users not encrypting the device storage, lack of backup policies, 
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inability for companies to have those devices wiped out remotely if needed 
(DigitalGuardian, 2020). Moreover, employee efficiency may be questioned since some 
organizations may choose to monitor the employee’s activity, or to prevent them from 
accessing non-business-related web sites and applications. This is not technically 
possible on a BYOD device, because the employee owns the asset (TrendMicro, 2015). 
Another threat related to personal devices, is that in case of a potential device theft, 
company data maybe be stolen or lost. 
In general, BYOD is not something organizations can apply strict policies on, because 
the device belongs to the employee. According to DigitalGuardian, 40% of large data 
breaches have been caused from BYOD, 50% of the companies that choose to allow 
the use of personal devices, have been breached via them and 60% of the organizations 
do not have the ability to delete company data from personal equipment that ex-
employees used as a mean to work remotely (DigitalGuardian, 2020). 
 
3.1.3. Home network security 
 
A significant threat directly related to remote working is the potential compromise of 
the home network an employee is working from. Traditionally large organizations 
choose to heavily invest on cyber security defenses across their network perimeter, 
having their employees working securely inside the corporate network. A remote 
worker though does not have the same level of protection, because neither he/she or the 
company can afford to invest on cyber security equipment for protecting the home 
network. 
Many organizations choose to use Virtual Private Network technologies for having 
their employees protected. VPNs are used for establishing a protected and encrypted 
network connection from a company owned laptop that is used in a home or public 
network, to the company’s network, hence allowing the worker to perform tasks as if 
he/she is in the corporate network (Kaspersky Labs, n.d.). Companies, however, often 
allow the use of BYOD devices, and in some cases, even though an employee may have 
a company device, he/she may choose to use a personal one instead (DigitalGuardian, 
2020). 
Besides the threats that arise from the lack of security policies on a personal device, 
there is a bigger threat since the home network is not protected efficiently. A classic 
example related to Home Network security, is the potential compromise of another 
personal device that belongs to a family member, which can then be used as a mean to 
attach the device the employee is using for remote work. Internet of Things (IoT) is 
another similar major threat that needs to be considered. According to Gartner”, IoT “is 
the network of physical objects that contain embedded technology to communicate and 
sense or interact with their internal states or the external environment” (Gartner, n.d.). 
Many people choose to use IoT devices in their homes, effectively converting them to 
“smart homes” or “connected homes”. Smart home devices are utilizing the home 
network, as well as the internet, for offering a connected, real-time, smart home 
experience to the household inhabitants, since it allows them to control and monitor 
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their home remotely (Gartner, n.d.). Security focus has not been the main focus of IoT 
vendors though, especially for the first devices that were released in the market a few 
years ago. Consumers do not have the education or knowledge to properly configure 
IoT devices in terms of security, therefore they leave them exposed to hackers. A 
potential IoT device compromise could allow an attacker to use it as a mean to attack 
other devices inside the home network, including company or personal owned 
equipment that is used for remote working (TrendMicro, 2019).  
 
3.2. Oil & gas industry information 
 
3.2.1. Industry description 
 
The oil & gas sector has traditionally been one of the world’s largest. According to 
Fortune 500, it was the top sector worldwide in terms of revenue, and third in terms of 
profit in 2019 (GlobalData, 2019). Even though there is a major shift towards renewable 
energy worldwide, it is expected that the oil & gas industry will continue to grow, 
reaching a global production of 100 million barrels per day, mainly due to the increasing 
demand from the BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India and China) (Investopedia, 2020). 
Structure-wise, the oil & gas industry is split into three segments, upstream, midstream 
and downstream. The upstream is also known as Exploration and Production (E&P), 
and it is focused on reservoirs discoveries and drilling of oil or gas wells. Midstream is 
responsible for transporting oil and gas from wells to refineries, while downstream is 
focused on refining tasks and the sale of the end-product (Investopedia, 2021). Some 
companies in the sector, choose to get involved only in certain segments, however there 
are others which are involved in all three, such as Royal Dutch Shell (Shell, n.d.). 
 
3.2.2. Oil & gas IT infrastructure & cyber security unique characteristics 
 
IT infrastructure and cyber security have some unique characteristics in the oil & gas 
industry, compared to other business sectors. Companies in the petroleum industry are 
extremely careful while designing and protecting what they call “Critical 
Infrastructure”. Some IT systems are vital, not just for the survival of the company, but 
in certain cases, depending on the size of that company, they can be vital for a nation’s 
economy as well. (Fortinet, n.d.).  
In terms of upstream infrastructure, oil & gas have a complex IT infrastructure both 
onshore and offshore which can prove valuable targets for several types of hackers. 
Midstream is mostly related to the SCADA system (Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition) and the IoT devices being used for monitoring and control. A potential 
attack to the SCADA system  that companies use for operating offshore rigs, wells, 
pipelines and refineries, can have a major impact on the environment, as well as 
operational disruptions, financial loss, reputational damage, and employee injury or 
loss of life (Fortinet, n.d.). Downstream infrastructure is relevant to refineries and 
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processing locations. A potential successful attack on downstream can also have a 
massive impact, since depending on the size of it, it can cause fuel supply shortages 
nationwide, financial loss and physical danger to employees or the general public 
(Fortinet, n.d.). Moreover, a potential attack on the corporate network can also have a 
significant impact, on finance (trading), data exposure (e.g. exploration and geological 
data) and leak of personnel information (Fortinet, n.d.). 
 
3.3. Past oil & gas industry cyber security incidents  
 
To get a better understanding of the potential impact of cyber security incidents related 
to the oil & gas industry, it would be useful to briefly outline a few of them, how they 
occured, and what was the impact from an operational and financial aspect.  
 
3.3.1. Norsk Hydro 
 
Norsk Hydro is a Norwegian enterprise organization with 35.000 employees that 
focuses mainly on Aluminum related services and products. Even though it is not an oil 
& gas company, it conducts business with multiple major organizations in that industry, 
since it specializes (amongst others) in aluminum design support in offshore and 
marine, as well as on extrusion technologies and friction stir welding (Hydro, n.d.). 
Norsk Hydro also has a strong presence into the Energy sector. 
Hydro suffered one of the most recent cyber-attacks in the Energy industry. More 
specifically, in March 2019, Hydro was affected by a major ransomware cyber-attack. 
The malware was spread across 40 site locations worldwide, and it was able to encrypt 
critical data in servers, workstations, and laptops. The company’s corporate network 
was brought down for preventing further spread of the ransomware virus, and services 
were disrupted, since the automated system of the manufacturing plant was affected, 
and the order processing and inventory management systems went down. The estimated 
cost impact was around 400-450 million NOK (41-46 million EUR) as it took more 
than three weeks to have all systems operating back to normal (Leppänen, et al., 2019, 
pp. 1,5). 
 
Figure 7 – Part of the post-infection note from LockerGoga virus (Leppänen, et al., 





Pemex (Petróleos Mexicanos) is the largest petroleum company of Mexico. The state-
owned petroleum organization has more than 120.000 employees, and it plays a major 
role in the country’s economy, since it has been providing up to one third of the yearly 
Mexican tax revenues collected from the local government (Reuters, 2013). The 
company is also known for its bad environment-friendly reputation (TheGuardian, 
2017),  as well as for its efforts to recover from its debt in order to avoid potential credit 
issues (Economist, 2019).  
In November 2019, Pemex was hit by a ransomware cyber-attack. The company was 
forced to shut down all IT systems across the corporate network, effectively bringing 
down all services, including payments. The ransomware responsible for the attack, was 
“DoppelPaymer”, which was known to be affiliated with a darknet website known for 
ransomware attacks. The organization did not release public details regarding 
operational and financial impact, and it was only stated that the attack affected only 5% 
of the IT systems within the corporate network. According to Pemex public statements, 
the company refused to pay the ransom demanded by the attackers, which was 565 
bitcoins (Reuters, 2019). 
 
3.3.3. Saudi Aramco 
 
Saudi Aramco is the world’s biggest oil and gas organization. With an 826.8 billion 
USD revenue, it currently holds rank #6 in Fortune’s Global 500 list (Fortune, 2020). 
The company has 96.000 employees worldwide, with strong global presence across 
Europe, America, and Asia (SaudiAramco, n.d.). On the negative side, it is responsible 
for 4,5% of the yearly global greenhouse emissions (TheGuardian, 2017). 
In August 2012, Saudi Aramco suffered one of the worst cyber-attacks in the industry’s 
modern era. The company has chosen to hide information related to the attack from 
public, however a few details have emerged during the past few years. According to 
information originating from a former Saudi Aramco information security advisor, it 
all started when one of the company’s employees, opened an email with a malicious 
attachment. The virus started spreading across the company’s clients and servers. 
Employees started reporting strange screen flickering on their PCs, and abnormal 
shutdowns. They also noticed that files started disappearing. The organizations’ s IT 
personnel decided to instantly shut down everything (a total of 35.000 computers) and 
disconnect all remote offices, effectively trying to block the further spread of the virus 
across the corporate network. Corporate emails were gone, the trading system also went 
down, and phone lines went dead. Employees started using typewriters and faxes as 
communication means. The only part which was unaffected was operations since this 
was an isolated and automated system. However, trucks that would try to get oil 
supplies were pilling up, and since trading was down, they were unable to fill their 
tanks, therefore they started leaving. Seventeen days after the attack, Saudi Aramco 
started giving oil for free, since trading was still not up. It took five months to bring 
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their IT systems back online and the global market was affected since Aramco was 
producing nearly 10% of the global oil production in 2012. To deal with the threat, the 
company paid higher values to computer hard disk manufacturers and purchased 50.000 
hard drives in replacement of their existing ones. This also caused a significant hard 
disk shortage and high prices worldwide (CNN, 2015). 
The hackers were never caught; however, it is known that a terrorist group called 
“Cutting Sword of Justice” took responsibility for the attack as a response of claimed  
responsibilities of Saudi Arabia’s royal family for war crimes committed in Middle East 
countries such as Bahrain, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and others (CNN, 2015). The 
financial impact is not known due to Saudi Aramco’s choice to keep information 
restricted. 
 
3.4. Oil & gas industry “Home Office” cyber security risks  
 
The information listed on the above subsections of the context description, can provide 
a clear overview of why “Home Office” generates cyber threats in the oil & gas 
industry. Companies conducting business in the sector choose to completely isolate the 
network related to plants, wells, refineries, and offshore platforms. They do so not just 
because of the potential financial or reputational impact, but mainly because their 
assets, as well as human life depends on that network, therefore it must be as isolated 
as possible from cyber threats. Unquestionably, the biggest threat of all, is the Internet, 
as that would be the most common method that potential hackers can use for reaching 
that network. Another major threat is the corporate network, since even though it has a 
lot of security layers / boundaries, it still has large exposure towards the internet mainly 
due to end-user experience and productivity reasons, as well as due to conducting daily 
tasks and communication to the outside world. It is also logical that if the internet is 
considered as a threat, so is the corporate network. 
Up until today, most oil & gas organizations would choose to do operations such as 
wells, drilling or offshore platforms, or trading by using on-premise personnel. They 
would rarely allow employees to do such tasks remotely, because if they do so, they 
would have to expose these services directly or indirectly to the internet. Therefore, the 
exposure of such tasks to remote workers was minimal or completely absent. This 
changed though since the industry organizations have been forced to expose parts of 
those tasks to home office users. The constant growing of digitalization and cloud in 
the business, introduced solutions such as the digital worker (OilPrice, 2020). The 
former is an asset because it allows legacy tasks that would require e.g. physical 
paperwork, to be done digitally, while the latter enables organizations to move services 
to the cloud, hence making them more easily accessible from the internet, compared to 
on-premise legacy services.  This allowed the companies to make remote working 
possible, even for critical tasks that used to be done from the within the organizations’ 
s premises. Digitalization and cloud though, also introduce risks since in many cases 
there is direct exposure to the internet, while access to such services relies mostly on 
strong authentication and role-based access of these users , rather than granting access 
from secured networks instead. 
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4. Research methodology 
 
The research methodology chosen for this thesis, has a qualitative orientation. 
According to Hewitt-Taylor, “the aim of qualitative research is to portray the reality 
of the area under investigation, and to enhance understanding of the situation and the 
meanings and values attributed to this by individuals; it does not involve the 
quantification of facts. Qualitative methods emphasize the value of individual 
experiences and views, as encountered in real-life situations” (Hewitt-Taylor, 2001, p. 
39). 
There are many different options for conducting qualitative research. This thesis mainly 
utilizes literature review and the interview method. 
 
4.1. Literature review 
 
Literature review is used for establishing the theoretical basis, gathering background 
information related to the risk assessment standards, as well as information related to 
cyber security which is linked to the oil and gas industry. The material originates mainly 
from academic literature, online publications from cyber security vendors / experts, 
books, articles, and the academic material provided during the Risk Analysis and 
Governance MSc in the University of Stavanger. The book and article resources are 
selected from the University of Stavanger online library, and the choice has been done 
based on citations, as well as the relevance and the quality of information offered from 
the authors. Citations evaluation is done mainly by using the “Publish or Perish” v7 
software tool, along with “Google Scholar” as the main source engine for conducting 
searches. Similarly, academic material offered by professors that originates from highly 
citated books and articles has been selected based on its relation to the research 
questions as well as the citation metrics in “Publish or Perish” (h-index, g-index, 
cites/year, total cites). 
Online articles are carefully chosen, and they mostly originate from risk science and/or 
cybersecurity vendors and authors, from highly acknowledged web portals, linked to 
risk science and cyber security. Articles published by Cisco or TrendMicro for example, 
have been selected because these companies have been classified as top network 
security vendors in reviews and ratings presented in multiple Gartner rating websites 
(Gartner, 2021; Gartner, 2021). Gartner is an important information resource due to its 
wide recognition in today’s global market and its mission to provide research / advisory, 
and consulting services to customers (Gartner, n.d.).  Facts related to COVID-19, home 
office, and past cyber security incidents in the oil and gas industry are taken from well-
established and recognized media/news agencies such as Forbes, New York Times, The 
Guardian, Reuters, and others. Information related to the risk assessment 
methodologies are taken mainly directly from the vendors, and more specifically from 
the vendor papers describing the specifics of each method. 
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4.2. Interview  
 
The interview is used as a mean for directly gathering information through cyber 
security experts and risk analysts, who offer their services to Equinor ASA, Norway’s 
largest oil and gas organization. For this purpose, a questionnaire has been established 
(Appendix I) which has a set of questions. It was sent to the persons to be interviewed 
prior to the meeting, for allowing them to gather all information required, as well as for 
agreeing with upper management on the set of enquiries and answers they can respond 
to. It has four different sections. The first one is focused on the risk assessment 
methodologies being used by Equinor, while the second is mostly about risk 
assessments, emergency and/or business continuity plans related to home office and 
cyber security. The third section addresses facts related to “Work from Home” and 
cyber security, while the last one contains questions for gathering information related 
to common cyber threats in the oil and gas business sector. 
The interview data acts as a support case study and reveals information from the 
organization’s view, on how they dealt with the sudden large-scale home office 
situation. The cyber security operational experts provide an insight on how they 
facilitated thousands of remote users, what infrastructure changes were required, who 
was part of the decision-making process, and how they cooperated with risk analysis 
experts to provide the necessary information to the upper management, which was then 
used as an input before deciding on how to move forward with the home office 
implementation. The risk analysts provide data with regards to cyber risk assessment 
methodologies used, what is their experience from a “strengths / weaknesses” 
perspective on the methods they are utilizing, and how were the “Home Office” risk 
assessments conducted. 
The literature and interview input will be used in this thesis as a benchmark to analyze 
the effectiveness of the pre-selected risk assessment methodologies while assessing and 
evaluating information security risks related to the “Work from Home” situation. The 
interview data will mostly be utilized as a case study that can provide a more realistic 
approach, with actual examples, for assessing the effectiveness of the methodologies. 
A key thing that should be noted is that the interviewed persons have chosen to provide 
limited information on specific questions, due to confidentiality limitations that were 
set by their organization prior to the interview. Moreover, the answers provided from 
the analysts, have been further processed by the author, to meet the needs of this thesis 








4.3. Linking research methodologies to research questions 
 
The first research question targets the selection of five popular information security risk 
assessment methodologies. It also provides a basic description of each of the 
preselected methods.  The choice is done based on literature review, and more 
specifically by evaluating the frequency of appearance of these methodologies in 
relevant books, articles and web sites related to cyber security and risk science. 
However, one of the methods was also chosen due to its relevance to the Equinor case 
study.  
The second research question is related to the identification of generic strengths and 
weaknesses that risk analysts, decision-makers and other stakeholders may experience 
while using the preselected five risk assessment methods. Research for this topic is 
purely based on literature review. 
The third research question is based on a mix of literature review and interview-based 
material. It uses the input from the previous two research questions, the theory, and the 
context information, for assessing the effectiveness of the five risk assessment methods 
for the home office implementation in the oil and gas industry. More specifically, it 
identifies positives / negatives that risk analysts, decision-makers and other 
stakeholders may face while using these methods for this use-case. The interview input 


















5. Information security risk assessments 
 
 
The key thesis objective is to evaluate the suitability of risk assessment methods for 
identifying, evaluating, and assessing risks related to “Home Office” with a focus on 
the oil & gas industry. A good starting point is the identification of common risk 
assessment techniques being used in the global market nowadays, the selection of which 
is done based on literature review, such as references, citations of risk methodologies 
on risk science articles, web sites and books. 
 
5.1. Introducing information security risk assessments 
 
Risk analysis techniques have been growing rapidly as industries and organizations 
worldwide choose to proactively adapt such techniques on the way they operate their 
business. At the same time, information security has a unique focus from a risk 
perspective since several methodologies are oriented and/or tailored around cyber risk 
and information security. The dynamic changes in the IT world where innovations are 
introduced promptly, make it often difficult for other directly or indirectly related 
sciences to keep up. In an effort to deal with the non-static world of the IT industry, 
several information security risk assessment / analysis frameworks have been 
implemented over the past few decades, while the developers responsible for their 
release and maintenance, constantly evolve them in order to keep them updated and 
meet the most recent information security science industry standards. 
There are three types of information security risk assessment frameworks, the 
qualitative, the quantitative, and some which are considered as a combination of both. 
This follows the risk analysis types description, which has been briefly analyzed in 
section 2.3 of the thesis. From a complexity perspective, the qualitative ones are 
generally considered less complex, much simpler and faster to conduct, while the pure 
quantitative ones are the most complex, time-consuming ones, however they are knows 
to provide solid results that are hard to challenge against. Therefore, depending on an 
organization’s need, or depending on the gravity and complexity of the subject to be 
analyzed from a risk analysis perspective, some companies might be using more than 
one risk assessment frameworks for their business needs. 
 
5.2. Selecting common information security risk assessments 
 
The identification and selection of the risk assessment methods to be analyzed, is 
mainly a result of literature review. The scope of this thesis is not to create a new risk 
assessment method(s), but rather to evaluate and analyze existing ones, and bring 
forward suggestions that could produce safer results / outcome for information security 
risk assessments related to “Work from Home” cyber threats. Talabis and Martin 
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choose to focus on ISO 27005, NIST SP800-30, FAIR, OCTAVE, ENISA, CRAMM, 
EBIOS and RiskIT on a similar comparison research they published in their book a few 
years back (Talabis & Martin, 2012, p. 13). A similar study from Agrawal, focuses on 
CORAS, CIRA, ISRAM and IS (Agrawal, 2017, pp. 60-61). Mnemonic AS, one of 
Norway’s largest companies focusing on cyber threats and information security risks, 
lists ISO 27005, ISO 31000, IRAM2, COSO ERM, and FAIR as suggested methods 
(Mnemonic AS, 2020). 
In general, qualitative methods seem to be more widely used because they offer a more 
understandable outcome and they are more time efficient. Quantitative on the other 
hand are mostly utilized in more complex projects, they have an objective orientation, 
and they offer a stronger outcome (Horvath, 2020; Goodrich, 2014). For the purposes 
of the thesis, three qualitative (IRAM2, OCTAVE Allegro, NIST SP800-30), one 
quantitative (FAIR), and one “open for customization” (ISO/IEC - ISO 27005:2018), 
methods have been selected. All five are included in the preidentified list of the most 
common ones. IRAM2, is in scope for the additional reason that Equinor ASA is using 
it. FAIR is chosen due to its popularity in the Fortune 1000 (FAIR Institute, n.d.). 
ISO/IEC - ISO 27005:2018 is widespread for its “tailoring” options and NIST SP800-
30 due to its unique IT Core Infrastructure features. Finally, Octave Allegro has been 
selected as a widely used, open standard method for performing qualitative information 
security risk assessments. 
 




One of the most common risk assessment methodologies nowadays is IRAM2 
(Information Risk Assessment Methodology 2). IRAM2 has been implemented by ISF 
(Information Security Forum) as a continuation of their original IRAM methodology. 
The second version though which was released in 2014, is a complete redesign, and it 
is a product of careful input and consultation from information risk practitioners and 
experts in the area. IRAM2 is a “members only” information security risk assessment 
standard, therefore it is not open as other methodologies are. Moreover, there is a web 
version offering called IRAM2 WebApp which is also based on the same methodology, 
allowing professionals to utilize an online tool for performing information risk 
assessments. ISF claims that IRAM2 is a risk assessment model that shares many 
similarities with other popular methodologies, however, while others end their lifecycle 
on risk evaluation, IRAM2 goes beyond that, offering a broader scope which also 
includes a pragmatic guidance on risk treatment. 
The six key objectives of IRAM2 are the following (ISF, 2014, p. 1): 
i. Apply a simple, practical yet rigorous approach. This objective outlines 
IRAM2’s strategy for a simplistic, practical and at the same time diligent 
technique, which can provide a solid, in-depth analysis, enabling organizations 
to perform strongly on business decision making. 
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ii. Focus on the business perspective. IRAM2 claims that the overall design of the 
method is focused on guiding risk practitioners towards an information risk 
assessment outcome with a strong business perspective emphasis. 
iii. Obtain a greater coverage of risks. This objective highlights the efficiency of 
the model on identifying all significant risk, hence drastically reducing chances 
of potentially missing some. 
iv. Focus on the most significant risks. IRAM2 enables efficient resource handling 
from a business perspective, since it provides solid risk classification, hence 
allowing the business to focus primarily on the ones with the highest 
importance. 
v. Speak a common language. A key objective for IRAM2 is to provide a common 
terminology and framework, which allows risk professionals to develop a 
unified view of information risk, and to offer greater integration / compatibility 
with the organization’s enterprise risk management. 
vi. Engage with key stakeholders. Finally, IRAM2 has a good engagement-based 
orientation, allowing risk professionals to involve relevant stakeholders in an 
organized, enterprise aware manner. 
In terms of how the IRAM2 risk assessment methodology is performed, it consists of 
six phases in total: 
I. Phase A / Scoping. The first phase is focused on the development of an 
environmental profile, as well as the definition of the assessment scope. The 
end goal is to provide the risk practitioner with the necessary means for 
obtaining a good understanding of the organization, as well as to define the 
scope of the assessment with the contribution of the relevant stakeholders. 
II. Phase B / Business Impact Assessment. During this phase, risk professionals 
shift their efforts on identifying information assets, and on assessing the 
potential impact on the business, if the identified assets are compromised. This 
can provide a good understanding on the environment information assets and 
their potential business impact ratings, for the business and the relevant 
stakeholders. The impact is rated in all aspects of the CIA triangle 
(Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability). 
III. Phase C / Threat Profiling. During the third phase, risk professionals and 
stakeholders focus on identifying risks. According to the methodology’s threat 
definition, anything that can cause harm to an information asset by its action or 
inaction, is identified as a threat. This phase also includes threat profiling and 
prioritization, since the most critical ones need to be prioritized against others 
with smaller significance, while the identified threats are labeled as adversarial, 
accidental or environmental. Threat profiling is done based on threat attribute 
assessment done by the risk practitioners. Finally, the last part of this phase is 
to identify the information assets that could potentially be impacted by the 
analyzed threats. 
IV. Phase D / Vulnerability Assessment.  The fourth phase is dedicated on assessing 
vulnerabilities related to pre-identified threats. By definition, a vulnerability 
within an environment, is a weakness in people, a process or technology. The 
identified vulnerabilities are mapped to each threat and are further assessed by 
evaluating the effectiveness of the corresponding controls. 
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V. Phase E / Risk Evaluation. During this phase, the risk practitioners perform an 
evaluation of the remaining risk factors which are likelihood of success, residual 
likelihood, and residual business impact rating. They also derive the residual 
likelihood of each risk, as well as the residual risk rating, which is then used for 
prioritizing the risks. 
VI. Phase F / Risk Treatment. The last phase, is the most highlighted one of the 
IRAM2 model, is related to the risk treatment approach, which starts with the 
creation of a risk treatment plan for each of the identified risks. It is mandatory 
for risk practitioners to be aware of the organization’s risk appetite, meaning 
that they should be familiar of the amount of risk(s) that the company is willing 
to accept. This phase also includes classification of the risks into categories 
depending on their origin (financial, reputational, health & safety, customer), 
since the organization might have set different acceptable risk limits for each of 
the categories. 
 
Figure 8 – IRAM2 phases 
 
Generic advantages / disadvantages 
 
In terms of generic advantages for IRAM2, it is worth noting that since it is a 
commercial product with a vendor supporting it, enterprise organizations can obtain 
much better support services, as well as access to the ISF research library, training 
material and numerous workshops. Moreover, many companies specializing in risk, 
offer IRAM2 as a managed service, meaning that the organization to use it hardly ever 
uses its own resources. Another significant strength is the risk treatment phase, which 
is something that cannot be found in many other alternatives. 
From a disadvantages point of view, it is worth noting that IRAM2  is a “members only” 
risk assessment methodology, therefore it is more expensive compared to standard that 
are open to the community, which may be an issue for smaller companies. Moreover, 
the cost may rise even further if training is to be included, since this is a separate cost. 
Finally, the methodology may seem complex and difficult to understand for 
stakeholders that do not originate from the risk science / risk business area, as it may 
prove to be too technical for them. 
 
5.3.2. ISO/IEC - ISO 27005:2018 
 
ISO 27005:2018 is part of the international ISO 27000 risk management series. It 
provides an outline on how to conduct an information security risk assessment, 
according to the generic guidelines and requirements set by the standard. It is important 
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for organizations seeking compliance, to demonstrate the use of it on information 
security risk assessments. The ISO 27005:2018 standard does not specify an explicit 
risk management methodology, however, it defines a recurrent information risk 
management process, which is based on six key elements (ISO/IEC, 2018, pp. 5-20): 
I. Context Establishment. During the initial stages of the ISO 27005:2018 
methodology, the risk practitioners focus on establishing the context, which 
includes criteria definition on risk identification, risk ownership responsibility, 
as well as how the CIA model is impacted by those risks, and how should the 
likelihood and impact of the identified risks should be measured. During the 
context establishment phase, risk experts also define the levels of risk the 
organization is willing to accept. 
II. Risk Assessment. The risk assessment phase is of great significance, since the 
organizations focus on their assets while developing a risk assessment process 
that is split into the following five sub-stages: 
a. Compiling information assets. 
b. Identification of threats and vulnerabilities, as well as their mapping the 
assets they are related to. 
c. Use of risk criteria to calculate the impact and likelihood of each threat 
and/or vulnerability. 
d. Risk evaluation against the predefined risk acceptability levels that were 
set during the context establishment phase. 
e. Risk prioritization. 
III. Risk Treatment. During this phase, the risk experts have four different options 
for dealing the risks in scope: 
a. Avoid the risk by taking measures to eliminate it. 
b. Modify the risk by taking measures / security controls for reducing the 
likelihood and/or the impact, hence reducing the overall risk score. 
c. Assign / Transfer the risk with a third party. 
d. Retain the risk if it falls within the organization’s predefined acceptable 
risks levels. 
IV. Risk Acceptance. According to the ISO 27005:2018 standard, the risk 
acceptance criteria need to be set by each organization, as they solely depend 
on policies, goals, objectives, and interests of the relevant organization 
stakeholders. For example, risk experts can consider risk acceptance criteria 
based on multiple thresholds, and if the score exceeds the threshold, senior 
managers can be consulted. A different example for expressing risk acceptance 
criteria, would be to express and evaluate the ratio of business estimated profit 
against the estimated risk. 
V. Risk Communication and Consultation. The risk communication and 
consultation chapter emphasize on the need of establishing and utilizing 
communication techniques which are the basis of information exchange 
between the risk practitioners and the relevant stakeholders across the 
organization. Risk communication is important for both normal operations, as 
well as emergency situations. 
VI. Risk Monitoring and Review. The final phase is dedicated on establishing 
continuous risk monitoring and review techniques, since risks can be dynamic. 
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Their nature might often change, new ones might be introduced, other assets 
might come into scope, and information security incidents may occur, therefore, 
it is important to take into account any changing attributes, while addressing the 
organization’s risk landscape. 
 
Generic advantages / disadvantages 
 
The ISO 27005:2018 standard is one of the most flexible ones in the market since it 
allows risk practitioners to “tailor” the methodology according to their own needs. 
Another strength is the reusability of it, the fact that it provides a complete risk 
management lifecycle, and it empowers to the risk practitioners and the stakeholders as 
it heavily relies of the concept of the human factor and responsibility. Lastly, the ISO 
standards/methodologies are well established in the market for decades, meaning that 
there is a lot of experience in the professional field, and organizations may use a wider 
set of them in other areas as well. 
From a weaknesses’ perspective, ISO 27005:2018 is not an open standard as it requires 
membership, therefore, is can prove to be costly for small or medium sized 
organizations. Moreover, it does not provide a specific methodology for calculating 
risk, threat and impact and it leaves it open for selection to the subjective opinion of 
risk practitioners, which in theory could produce unreliable results. This can be 
perceived as a weakness by some practitioners; however, others may see it as a strength 
since it allows them to use whatever methodology they prefer along with ISO 
27005:2018. For example, the FAIR-ISO/IEC 27005 Cookbook describes how to 
integrate the FAIR risk methodology model to any risk management framework (FAIR 
Institute, n.d.). 
 
Figure 9 – ISO 27005 Information Security Risk Management Process (ISO/IEC, 
2018, p. 4) 
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5.3.3. Octave Allegro 
 
OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation) was 
conceived in 1999 by the Software Engineering Institute of Carnegie Mellon 
University. The end goal was to help organizations on identifying and evaluating 
information security risks. In general, OCTAVE is self-directed, and it comes in 
alignment with Pareto’s law (the 80-20 principle), which claims that 80% of the effects 
originates from 20 of the causes. Therefore, as a methodology, it chooses to follow the 
“most critical assets” risk analysis approach for prioritizing improvement areas 
(ComputerWeekly, 2011). It consists of three different methodologies, the OCTAVE, 
OCTAVE-S and the most recent OCTAVE Allegro. The latter aims to provide a 
streamlined process, with a clear focus on information assets, on how they are used, 
where they are stored, how they are transported and processed, and most importantly 
how due to all of the above, they end up being exposed to threats, vulnerabilities and 
disruptions. The developers of OCTAVE Allegro claim that this method makes all the 
above possible, without setting an extensive information security knowledge as a 
mandatory requirement. The method utilizes workshops and collaborative setups, and 
it can also make use of questionnaires, worksheets and guides as supporting means. 
OCTAVE Allegro consists of eight steps, which are grouped into four stages (Software 
Engineering Institute, 2007, pp. 4-5): 
I. Establish drivers. During the initial stages of the OCTAVE Allegro method, the 
risk practitioners must develop risk measurement criteria. This is implemented 
in line with the organization’s goals, objectives, missions, and general drivers. 
II. Profile Assets. The second phase is dedicated on information asset profile 
development, as well as information asset containers identification. According 
to the methodology, during this stage, risk practitioners need to profile all assets 
that are identified as critical. This process sets asset boundaries and it also 
produces asset security requirements, asset location identification and asset 
processing and transportation data, as a stage outcome. 
III. Identify Threats. Phase three is focused on identifying areas of concern, and 
specific threat scenarios. During this phase, risk experts shift their efforts on 
identifying all potential threats to the pre-identified information assets, in the 
context of where the assets are stored, transported, or processed. 
IV. Identify and mitigate risks. The final stage of the Allegro methodology is 






Figure 10 – OCTAVE Allegro Roadmap (Software Engineering Institute, 2007, p. 
4) 
Generic advantages / disadvantages 
 
One of the strengths of the OCTAVE methodology, is that it is free, no membership is 
required for using it (ENISA, n.d.). That also implies that it has an open community, 
which can be used for information or advise exchange between companies / risk 
practitioners that use it. Moreover, it can be implemented in parts, allowing the 
organization to choose which ones should be in scope (ComputerWeekly, 2011). As a 
standard, it does not require focus on all assets, since it follows Pareto’s law, therefore 
it allows organizations to focus on what is relevant to the business context. 
On the other hand, OCTAVE is a high-complexity method, since it produces high 
amounts of documentation which can prove difficult and time consuming for risk 
practitioners to process. As a qualitative method, it relies on subjectivity of the risk 
experts / stakeholders participating in the risk assessment process, therefore the result 
may prove unreliable. Moreover, even though it is a free standard that anyone may use, 
the tools supporting this methodology are commercial products using licensing model. 
The same applies for training material. Therefore, there is a cost that needs to be 




FAIR stands for Factor Analysis of Information Risk. It is a cyber security risk 
framework implemented by the FAIR institute, and its methodology fundamentally 
uses a quantitative approach for dealing with cyber risks. FAIR is very popular as 45% 
of Fortune 1000 organizations are using it, while it has more than 10.000 members 
worldwide (FAIR Institute, n.d.). According to the creators of FAIR, it is the only 
international standard quantitative model for information security and operational risk 
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(FAIR Institute, n.d.). The methodology developers are emphasizing the fact that FAIR 
has not been implemented to compete with other information security risk standards, 
but rather to join them as a complementary method that can offer the means to provide 
accurate information against questions such as “How much risk does X represent”, 
“How much risk do we have”, “How much more/less risk will we have if…?”, or “What 
are the most cost-effective options for managing risk” (FAIR Institute, n.d.). This 
comes in contrast compared to other methodologies such as the “Checklist” based ones 
(e.g. PCI, ISO BITS, etc.) which aim on establishing practice inventories that 
organizations can use for risk evaluation and benchmarking, or “CMM” methodologies 
(Capability Maturity Models)  that mostly target process quality evaluation, setting 
goals and assessing the progress against them. 
The FAIR methodology consists of ten steps, which are further grouped into four phases 
(Risk Management Insight, n.d., pp. 2-11). 
I. Stage 1 – Identify scenario components. 
i. Identify the asset at risk. During the first step, the risk practitioner needs 
to identify and evaluate the specific asset(s) which is at risk. 
ii. Identify the threat community under consideration. The next step of the 
FAIR methodology is to have the threat community identified; therefore, 
the risk analysts need to decide whether the threat originates from 
humans or malware, and if they are internal or external. As a follow-up, 
the risk experts also try to characterize the nature of the threat 
community. 
II. Stage 2 – Evaluate Loss Event Frequency (LEF) 
iii. Estimate the probable Threat Event Frequency (TEF). Step #3 is about 
estimating the potential frequency within a given timeframe, that a 
specific threat agent can act against an asset.  
iv. Estimate the Threat Capability (TCap). The Threat capability is an 
estimation of the probable level of force that a threat actor can have, 
against the asset in scope. 
v. Estimate Control strength (CS). The fifth step is dedicated on 
calculating the effectiveness of controls that may be applied as 
mitigating actions. The output provides a rating of a specified control, 
against a baseline level of force, within a given period. 
vi. Derive Vulnerability (Vuln). This step is about calculating the 
probability of an asset being affected from the threat agent. It is 
effectively a matrix calculation where Tcap (step #4) and CS (step #5) 
are being used on a 2-axis board. 
vii. Derive Loss Event Frequency (LEF). During this step, the risk analysts 
take the output of steps #3 and #6 (TEF and Vuln) and produce a matrix 
for calculating the frequency of a potential threat harming a specific 
asset. 
III. Stage 3 – Evaluate Probable Loss Magnitude (PLM) 
viii. Estimate worst-case loss. The outcome of the previous steps allows risk 
analysts to calculate worst case scenarios, where a specific actor acts 
against an asset, with the highest possible frequency, resulting in the 
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worst possible outcome. The magnitude of this outcome is then 
calculated and summed with others. 
ix. Estimate probable loss. The probable loss is estimated in step #9, by 
using a 3-step procedure. Risk practitioners identify the most likely 
threat community actions. As a follow-up, they calculate the probable 
loss magnitude for each loss form, and finally they sum up all the pre-
calculated magnitudes. 
IV. Stage 4 – Derive and articulate Risk 
x. Derive and articulate risk. Step #10 is the end-goal of the whole FAIR 
methodology. If risk analysts follow the procedure and they do effective 
calculations, they can provide the estimated loss event frequency (LEF) 
and the estimated probable loss magnitude (PLM) figures, both of which 
are characterized as key information for risk analysts, organizations 
and/or relevant risk stakeholders. The output is often demonstrated with 
a matrix, where LEF and PLM are using in the 2-axis board that 
characterizes the risk. 
 
Figure 11 – The FAIR model (FAIR Institute, n.d.) 
 
Generic advantages / disadvantages 
 
FAIR is a quantitative methodology. It is therefore likely to produce very accurate 
results, which are hard to argue against. Moreover, the overall procedure has a good 
logic and it is relatively easy to understand. In addition to that, the FAIR standard is 
open, therefore a membership in the FAIR institute organization can provide access to 
the organizations which are interested on using it. Since it is widely used in enterprise-
level organizations, competent and experienced resources can be found out in the 
market. 
On the other hand, training can be costly, which could prove an impediment for small 
to medium organizations. Furthermore, since it is a quantitative method, it is bound to 
take longer in time to complete against less resource and time intensive qualitative 
techniques. As a methodology it has a respectful complexity level, and it may prove 
challenging to implement in case the risk analysts do not have sufficient metric data 
available. The outcome can also be hard to follow, since multiple matrix boards, 
directly related to each other may prove to be confusing, especially if they are presented 
to stakeholders unfamiliar with the concept of FAIR, or the risk science in general. 
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5.3.5. NIST SP800-30 
 
The SP800-30 risk assessment methodology comes from the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST). On a broader scale, the SP800-30 special 
publication can be considered as an add-on / part for the NIST CSF (Cyber Security 
Framework), which is a well-known risk management framework in today’s industry. 
Its purpose is to empower companies on conducting risk assessments in line with the 
broader NIST recommendations standards. A key characteristic of SP800-30 is the 
ability to assist risk practitioners on communicating with business-oriented 
stakeholders such as CEOs or the company’s board, since it uses a common language 
which is easily understandable by all the involved parties (Peacock, 2020).  
The methodology consists of four steps, each of which is split into several tasks (NIST, 
2012, pp. L1-L2): 
I. Step 1: Prepare for Risk Assessment 
▪ Task 1-1: Identify Purpose. During the initial stages of the SP800-30 
methodology, risk analysts must make a clear definition the risk 
assessment targets in terms of information to be produced, and decisions 
to be supported based on the outcome. 
▪ Task 1-2: Identify Scope. The next task is related to scope identification. 
The outcome is produced taking several factors into account, such as 
organizational applicability, time frame, and other considerations 
related to technology and architecture. 
▪ Task 1-3: Identify Assumptions and Constraints. A key task is to identify 
any assumptions and constraints related to the risk assessment that may 
affect the outcome. 
▪ Task 1-4: Identify Information Sources. During this step, risk 
practitioners identify information sources to be used in the risk 
assessment. 
▪ Task 1-5: Identify Risk Model and Analytic Approach. The final task of 
the first phase is to set the risk model / analytic approach that will be 
used as a baseline in the risk assessment. 
II. Step 2: Conduct Risk Assessment 
▪ Task 2-1: Identify Threat Sources. The first task of the second phase is 
dedicated on identification and characterization of threat sources of 
concern, and more specifically on the intent, capability and targeting 
characteristics of the threats. Based on that information, they 
characterized as adversarial and non-adversarial. The difference 
between them is that the former originates from individuals, groups, 
organizations, or states with a clear goal of exploitation, while the latter 
originates from actions that have no direct intention of causing harm / 
damage, such as natural disasters, or human errors.  
▪ Task 2-2: Identify Threat Events. During this task, risk analysts identify 
potential threat events, their relevance and threat sources that could 
potentially ignite those events.  
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▪ Task 2-3: Identify Vulnerabilities and Predisposing Conditions. The 
third task is devoted on vulnerabilities identification, as well as on 
detecting the predisposing conditions that can affect the likelihood of 
the threat events. 
▪ Task 2-4: Determine Likelihood. The follow up task uses the input from 
tasks 2-1 to 2-3 as basis, to determine the likelihood of threat events. 
▪ Task 2-5: Determine Impact. During 2-5, the risk analysts calculate the 
potential impact of the threat events, based on information related to 
their characteristics, the pre-identified vulnerabilities, and predisposing 
conditions, and the measures/safeguards the organization has taken for 
preventing such events. 
▪ Task 2-6: Determine Risk. The last task is focused on defining the risk 
the organization is facing, considering the potential impact from the 
threat events, as well as their likelihood. 
III. Step 3: Communicate and Share Risk Assessment Results 
▪ Task 3-1: Communicate Risk Assessment Results. During the initial 
stages of the third phase, risk analysts use the common language 
framework to communicate the results towards organizational decision 
makers with an end goal to support risk responses.  
▪ Task 3-2: Share Risk-Related Information. The next task is dedicated on 
communicating / sharing the outcome produced from the risk 
assessment towards personnel relevant to the whole process. 
IV. Step 4: Maintain Risk Assessment 
▪ Task 4-1: Monitor Risk Factors. During this task, risk practitioners shift 
their effort on monitoring pre-identified risk factors that may affect or 
change the risk landscape. 
▪ Task 4-2: Update Risk Assessment. As a follow up to 4-1, risk analysts 
conduct frequent risk assessment updates based on the monitoring 
output. 
 
Figure 12 – NIST SP800-30 Risk Assessment Process (NIST, 2012, p. 23) 
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Generic advantages / disadvantages 
 
One of the strongest points of SP800-30, is the effective systematic methodology it 
utilizes, as well as the common language framework, for cybersecurity risk treatment 
purposes. This enhances communication between risk analysts and business-oriented 
personnel involved in the risk decision-making process, as the information passed on 
to them is easily understandable and it can produce safer and solid decisions. Moreover, 
it offers good scalability and it can be used from any company / organization, regardless 
of its size. It is an open standard, with rich documentation. Another advantage is that 
NIST has been built with a focus on core IT infrastructure, therefore it can be effective 
on information security risk management. 
From a disadvantage perspective, there is no clear definition of metrics to be used. 
Moreover, SP800-30 can prove complex depending on the size of the organization, as 
well as the predefined scope, and it is known as a difficult cyber security risk assessment 
framework in terms of usability. Another potential weakness is the high focus on core 
IT infrastructure which may prove an impediment since modern organizations choose 
to move away from legacy IT infrastructure, shifting towards cloud services. Moreover, 
since the orientation of this methodology is technical, it does not deal with some non-
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Table 3 – Selected risk assessments generic overview (FAIR Institute, n.d.; ENISA, 
n.d.; NIST, 2012; ISO/IEC, 2018; ISF, 2014) 
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6. Equinor ASA case study 
 
Equinor ASA (previously known as Statoil ASA and StatoilHydro) is Norway’s largest 
oil & gas company, with more than 21.000 employees worldwide. It has a presence in 
more than 30 countries globally and a total revenue of 45.8 billion USD (Equinor ASA, 
2021). Equinor is considered as a large global oil & gas player, since it has reached 
Fortune’s Global 500 top 40 ranks twice in its recent history (Fortune, 2021). It plays a 
major role in the development of the Norwegian economy, as it has by far the biggest 
number of licenses, operatorships, operatorships fields and operatorships discoveries 
within the country (Norsk Petroleum, n.d.), while the petroleum and gas industry has 
been Norway’s economy pylon in the last few decades, since it has contributed more 
than 15.700 billion NOK to Norway’s GDP since the early 1970s (Norsk Petroleum, 
n.d.). Equinor has been shifting its focus in the Energy industry during the past few 
years, with major investments and technological discoveries. The energy related shift 
and innovations of the organization are much highlighted, indicating the company’s 
efforts to switch to cleaner and more environment-friendly energy production going 
forward, with an end goal to contribute on the global effort of CO2 emissions reduction 
(Equinor ASA, n.d.).  
Equinor was kind enough to provide two key resources for an interview. The first one 
was a cyber security operations / IT infrastructure expert, while the second one was an 
IT infrastructure / information security risk rnalysis expert. Both resources and their 
teams played a major role during the home office implementation, which was 
introduced as a global measure beginning of March 2020, for protecting the health of 
the company’s workforce, as well as for ensuring business continuity during the global 
pandemic outbreak. 
 
6.1. Pre-“Home Office” implementation interview feedback 
 
Equinor started looking into a potential global home office scenario, around two weeks 
before it was introduced. It was end of February 2020, when the company started 
considering this state seriously, since the outbreak started having a strong presence in 
Europe. Weeks before that, the organization chose to shut down their offices in Beijing, 
sending all local employees to work remotely from home. According to the Equinor 
interview resources, no workshops, risk assessments or threat simulations had been 
done in the past for a scenario where almost 100% of the company’s global workforce 
would work from home. A significant effort was made though from end of February, 
where IT infrastructure experts were called in and received the highly prioritized task 
of investigating whether the organization could facilitate this project, both from a 
capacity / availability, as well as from a cyber security threat perspective. The plan, 
implementation and execution proved to be efficient for day#1 of the home office 
situation, however due to the limited timespan available, a few minor misses occurred, 
most of which were resolved during the first week of the work from home state. The 
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organization also implemented a business continuity plan, part of which was having 
almost all users working remotely. 
With regards to the team that was assembled to deal with this project, the IT 
Infrastructure sector leader was challenged to come up with a plan for deploying a 
global scale home office. His response was to establish an IT “War Room”, where IT 
leaders, global Equinor offices representatives, operational experts, operations 
vendors/partners, as well as critical business areas representatives were invited. The 
expertise area covered remote user solutions, cyber security engineers, information 
security analysts, as well as network and cloud infrastructure leading advisors and 
experts. Critical areas of the business such as trading, exploration, drilling and offshore 
were also represented in the whole process. 
The group managed to reach the goal of expanding the remote users’ capacity, which 
was mainly achieved by growing existing remote users’ solutions, as well as 
introducing new ones. A key success factor was that all employees had corporate 
managed devices, and that the company was already deeply into migrating services to 
the cloud, which are much easier and faster to expand. The risk management team 
would assess new and existing solutions, generated threats, and take actions / provide 
input accordingly towards decision makers. It was also noted that there were exceptions 
for some applications / services / tasks, where employees would only perform those 
with a physical presence in an office location. This was due to lack of technical 
solutions that could facilitate remote work for these tasks, or (in most cases) tasks that 
would impose a great risk if they were allowed to be executed remotely. 
 
6.2. Post-“Home Office” implementation interview feedback 
 
A set of interview questions provided an insight on the post-implementation period for 
Equinor. According to the interviewed personnel, most of the tasks were completed as 
planned and within the predefined timelines. Managers and leaders provided business 
support to the experts, allowing them to focus entirely on “Work from Home” related 
tasks. Even though there were no major challenges or barriers, two factors were 
identified as potential threats:  
▪ Equinor’s dependency on vendors. If the vendors would not be able to deliver 
certain products in time, Equinor could have missed the deadlines that were set.  
▪ Equinor’s dependency on operational experts. Even though there is redundancy 
on most operational experts, further expansion of the team could be an asset as 
it would remove any resource dependencies. 
IT infrastructure operational experts have been following up on remote solutions that 
have been built, considering potential risks that are relevant to those. Mitigating actions 
are being taken for reducing the chances of occurrence for the identified threats, as well 
as their impact. Equinor experts also noted that they exchanged information with other 
peers / colleagues in the industry for sharing experiences, as well as for getting insights 
on how they dealt with the situation. Most reported that they also implemented similar 
solutions within less than a week, or even during a single weekend. 
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6.3. Oil & gas industry cyber security interview feedback 
 
A set of questions was related to the cyber security for the oil and gas industry. 
According to the experts, the sector is threatened by common cyber security threats, 
which are relevant to other industries as well. What is more unique for this business 
area, is the type of threat actors, and more specifically the motive of a hacker. Moreover, 
organizations heavily rely on assets, such as onshore / offshore platforms. Therefore, 
the dedicated network of those assets, as well as the trading systems of an oil & gas 
company are critical, and most likely the top target of a potential threat actor. The 
technical networks related to wells are very critical as well, due to the additional fact 
that human life depends on them. Moreover, a potential incident may have harmful 
impact on the environment. Another part of the business which has IT dependencies 
and has a negative aftermath in case it gets compromised, is drilling, and more 
specifically, the software that obtains, processes and monitors drilling related data. 
With regards to specific services that might generate a higher cyber security threat, the 
experts responded that certain services run through on-premise software platforms with 
high security standards / multiple security layers, due to high impact in case of a service 
compromise. Naturally, such tasks pose a bigger threat when the user works remotely 
since some security layers may not be applicable anymore. Most of those services are 
related to assets (e.g. offshore platforms), trading, or drilling / exploration. Moreover, 
there is hardware / software in Equinor which is used mainly in the oil & gas industry 
and is mostly related to assets (e.g. offshore), or trading of oil & gas. Cyber security 
intelligence gathering is done by multiple relevant teams across the organization. 
Equinor also gets input from relevant Norwegian government, as well as 3rd party 
vendors. 
 
6.4. Risk assessment methodologies interview feedback 
 
Equinor mainly uses Information Security Forum’s IRAM2 for conducting cyber 
security risk assessments. In certain cases, the American Petroleum Institute’s “Security 
Risk Methodology for Petroleum and Petrochemical Industries” (API 780) may also be 
used. These external standards have in turn been aligned with Equinor’s internal 
management system for risk management. Both standards have been customized to fit 
company needs with appropriate scales for consequence assessment, threat assessment 
and vulnerability assessment. The combination of threat and vulnerability is used to 
derive a probability score for scenarios. 
Equinor occasionally evaluates where the selected methodologies are efficient enough. 
They had two major revisions since 2014. Equinor does not have any set intervals for 
when to evaluate the risk assessment methodology, and this depends also on the 




Regarding Equinor’s experience while using these methodologies, it was highlighted 
that they provide a standardized way of assessing cyber risk, so that different security 
professionals use the same approach while comparing results, and also that these 
methodologies are aligned with enterprise risk management in the company overall,  
meaning that it’s possible to compare cyber risk with any other type of risk. Equinor 
values that they are built from international and recognized industry standards. As an 
improvement point, the risk analysis expert stressed out the fact that in certain scenarios 



























7. Risk assessments effectiveness on home office from an oil 
& gas industry perspective 
 
The significance of assessing risks related to home office from an oil & gas industry 
perspective is unquestionably immense. Human life, environmental pollution and 
financial damage are highlighted amongst several assets that can be potentially 
threatened from cyber-attacks. Moreover, societies and countries can be affected from 
a humanitarian and financial point of view, since a successful attack could affect 
supplies across multiple nations. 
 
7.1. Basics of evaluating risk assessment quality 
 
According to Aven, the scientific quality of a risk assessment requires at least two 
perspectives for proper quality judgement: the analyst / scientist perspective, and the 
decision-maker’s perspective, which can be expanded to include other relevant 
stakeholders. From a risk analyst perspective, it is important to meet some basic 
scientific requirements such as (Aven, 2020, p. 37): 
▪ Work solidness, meaning it follows rules, limitations, constrains and 
assumptions which have been pre-identified, its logical, and in general the 
preselected approaches and methods have a solid justification  
▪ Analysis relevance and usefulness, meaning it is related to the analysis target, 
and it contributes on solving the underlying problem. 
▪ Assessment validity and reliability, where the former refers to the successful 
analysis measurements, while the latter refers to the consistency of the 
measuring methods. Aven highlights the importance of having both reliable and 
valid results. (Aven, 2020, p. 88). 
▪ Knowledge level identification since it is important to identify knowledge or 
lack of knowledge in relevant areas or involved parties. 
▪ Experience / Competence of the risk analysis team. 
With regards to the decision-makers’ perspective, it is important that they feel confident 
for the result produced from the assessment in question. Aven highlights factors that 
can contribute towards a stronger confidence for them and other stakeholders (Aven, 
2020, pp. 37-38): 
▪ The analysts / scientist judgement regarding the strength of knowledge that 
supports the results, and the potential risk of deviations from the assumptions 
made. 
▪ The decision-maker’s own assessment of issues related to the previous point. 
▪ The importance of the decision-maker’s understanding of the risk assessment 
output. 
▪ The decision maker’s judgement for evaluating the competence of the involved 
analysts and scientists. 
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Furthermore, Aven also emphasizes that decision-makers and managers do not have the 
necessary risk science expertise to be able to evaluate the quality of the outcome of a 
risk assessment, against the predefined reliability and validity criteria requirements. 
Risk analysts should inform them though on general topic insights, as well as a set of 
common validity problems which are applicable such as (Aven, 2020, p. 133): 
▪ Important risk factors relevant to the background knowledge may be hidden. 
▪ Risk and uncertainty assessments may be incomplete. 
▪ Hazardous situations may be missed. 
Highlighting the above to decision-makers and managers is important since they will 
always be responsible of the consequences of a choice, therefore it is important to 
understand the outcome of risk assessments and any potential constrains (Aven, 2020, 
p. 134). 
 
7.2. Risk assessments review 
 
The main investigation topic of this thesis is to evaluate whether the pre-selected risk 
assessment methods can be efficient for assessing cyber security risks related to the 
home office from an oil & gas industry perspective. The efficiency of those methods 
will be examined from a risk analysts and decision-makers point of view, therefore it 
will have a risk science orientation / approach. 
 
7.2.1. The time factor consideration 
 
Before conducting a specific evaluation for each of the five risk assessment 
methodologies, it is important to highlight a key factor, which is the time given to the 
oil and gas industry companies to react to the global pandemic and introduce remote 
work solutions for their employees. Several sources indicate that the remote work was 
rationally introduced within days, effectively forcing the companies to swiftly deploy 
these solutions in a large scale (pwc, n.d.; Norton, 2020). This comes in alignment with 
the Equinor case study, where the implementation of remote work solutions was done 
in less than ten days. The persons interviewed, mentioned that there were other peers 
in their industry, who introduced similar solutions in even fewer days, in some cases 
during a single weekend. 
It can therefore be assumed that all five risk assessment methods would prove unusable, 
since there is simply not enough time to conduct even medium complexity risk 
assessments within a few days. The logical sequence of introducing a new solution for 
remote users would be to design it and involve risk analysts for identifying cyber 
security risks generated from the new solution, which would have to involve several 
stakeholders, technical experts, decision-makers, and other. The outcome would quite 
possibly take weeks, a risk treatment phase would follow, which would then lead to 
new evaluations. If the solution was finally accepted from higher management, it would 
require days (or weeks) to have it implemented. All of this seems extremely challenging 
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if it is to be done within a short time span. The only scenario that could prove to be 
realistic in a such short period, would be companies that have done similar risk 
assessments / workshops / simulations in the past, and they had a business continuity 
plan, and solutions pre-designed. 
If the home office use-case is to be studied retrospectively from oil and gas 
organizations, there are learnings that can be harvested for two main scenarios from a 
time perspective. The first one would reflect the rationality this solution was introduced 
upon. In other words, how could a company approach a similar matter in such a short 
time span? The second one, assumes that there is more time to act before introducing 
such solutions, possibly weeks or months. The effectiveness review of the five risk 
assessment methodologies in this thesis, the findings, and the suggestions, offer input 
for both scenarios, since some observations are valid on a general basis, while others 
are for the specific example where the reaction time was quite limited. 
 
7.2.2. Risk assessment methodologies evaluation 
 
ISF - IRAM2 
 
IRAM2 can be very effective for evaluating cyber risks related to the oil & gas industry 
due to several reasons, however certain limitations need to be highlighted as well. From 
a duration perspective, it can provide quality results within weeks since it is not very 
time consuming. This is important since many oil & gas remote worker solutions are 
already exposed, without relying the decision to enable them, on proper risk assessment 
results. The business continuation rationality forced companies towards this action, 
however, as a post-action, it is important to investigate each remote solution separately, 
identify missed relevant cyber threats and take the necessary mitigating actions. If this 
process takes months, a potential weakness / vulnerability might be exploited, and an 
unwanted incident may occur. Equinor’s case study also supports this approach, since 
it was highlighted that several issues were identified the first few weeks, most of which 
were fixed with follow-up mitigating actions. 
Furthermore, IRAM2 empowers decision-makers and business-oriented stakeholders, 
since it guides risk analysts towards an outcome that has a high focus on the business, 
which makes decision-makers more confident. Moreover, it has a common language 
that can be understood across the different business areas; therefore, the output of the 
risk assessment is clear to the involved parties. It also helps from a risk communication 
perspective due to the common language and framework, which are more easily 
understood from risk analysts that conduct similar research on non-IT related areas. 
Equinor’s risk analysis experts mention this element as a strength that allows them to 
approach other risk teams within Equinor for comparing and verifying results and 
measurements. According to the interview, the IT War Room participants were from 
different areas of the business, with different backgrounds, yet they were aligned, 
understanding risk assessment outputs, and they contributed to solid decision-making 
and business continuity planning development. The involvement and active 
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participation of the relevant stakeholders also ensured that IT experts from different 
areas and responsibilities, could express their concerns on risks that might have not 
been identified otherwise. 
Another important asset for risk analysts which is beyond the methodology suitability, 
is the COVID-19 / cyber risk related material which is updated from ISF and other 
community members with new data (ISF-Live, 2020).  
From a limitations’ perspective, IRAM2 may prove complex to follow for new 
inexperienced risk analysts, or for other parties that may be involved in the conducting 
part of the risk assessment, since it is a methodology that requires practitioners to have 
a decent level of competence. This can be an issue, considering the overgrowing need 
of deploying new remote workers solutions, which also implies a growing demand for 
more highly experienced risk analysts, since existing resources may not be sufficient 
for carrying out pending tasks. This also imposes a higher risk for cyber security 
incidents, due to unknown threats that may not be identified unless a full risk 
assessment is conducted. 
Equinor’s risk analysis experts also expressed concerns regarding uncertainty, since it 
is often challenging to capture and describe it. 
ISF IRAM2 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Time efficient Complexity 
Business focus May prove difficult to hire competent 
risk analysts due to growing demand 
Solid decision-making Lack of competent resources may lead to 
risk assessments piling up 
Common language Pending risk assessments postpone 
identifying and dealing with unknown 
cyber threats that are present already  
Effective risk communication Uncertainty 
COVID-19 related support material  
 
Table 4 – ISF IRAM2 strengths and weaknesses on dealing with home office cyber 
risks (oil & gas industry perspective)   
 
ISO/IEC – ISO 27005:2018 
 
Just as IRAM2, ISO 27005:2018 can also prove to be effective for identifying and 
evaluating cyber risks related to the home office situation for oil and gas organizations. 
The effectiveness though depends on multiple factors, since ISO 27005:2018 does not 
define a risk management methodology, meaning that the risk analysts can choose to 
integrate qualitative / quantitative methods in it. This could prove to be an asset and an 
impediment at the same time, depending on the circumstances. If for example an 
organization is using ISO 27005 and the risk analysts were to use a qualitative risk 
methodology approach, they would get relatively fast results which would allow them 
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to investigate within weeks if the remote workers solutions that have been exposed are 
not vulnerable to cyber threats. However, if the organization would use a quantitative 
method that would be more time-consuming, they would be vulnerable for a longer 
period. In general, ISO 27005’s flexibility would also mean that the risk analysts could 
change the procedure depending on the company’s needs, which can be a positive 
factor. 
Another strength of ISO 27005:2018 is ISO’s popularity in the market. Equinor and 
several other organizations reported that they had to initiate several projects for 
exposing solutions to the internet for remote workers. Internet is the most preferred 
mean for malicious users that make attempts on compromising an organization’s IT 
infrastructure. If the company’s capacity supports dealing with X risk assessments per 
month, and due to COVID-19 / home office the requirement becomes Y per month, 
where Y is significantly higher than X, the organization needs to hire employees or 
consultants to deal with the situation. ISO’s popularity would lead to better chances of 
hiring competent personnel for dealing with the company’s requirements. 
Another ISO 27005 strength is the fact that it heavily relies on the concept of human 
factor and responsibility, both of which are significant in the oil and gas industry, due 
to the potential consequences of severe incidents, especially with regards to human life 
and environmental damage. 
In general, ISO 27005:2018 is challenging while evaluating its effectiveness, because 
of its flexibility and the ability of risk analysts to tailor the standard to their preferences. 
The suitability heavily depends on several options, the most important being the choice 
of the methodology to be integrated for estimating risk. 
ISO/IEC ISO 27005:2018 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Can be time efficient Can be time consuming 
Easy to get competent / experienced 
resources 
Uncertainty 
Flexible for tailoring  




Table 5 – ISO/IEC ISO 27005:2018 strengths and weaknesses on dealing home office 




Octave Allegro has both strengths and weaknesses as a methodology, if it is to be 
utilized for assessing cyber threats related to home office in the oil and gas industry. 
Perhaps the most important advantage is the choice it provides to risk practitioners on 
focusing on specific assets only which are relevant to the business context. This could 
potentially save time for oil & gas organizations trying to identify and evaluate cyber 
risks for solutions that have already been rationally exposed to the internet. It is also 
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open / community based, therefore there is information from other peers that might 
provide insights in relation to the swift home office deployment. 
On the other hand, there are certain weaknesses that risk practitioners need to be aware 
of. Octave Allegro follows Pareto’s law, which implies that around 80% of the assets 
in scope would be identified as related / important for the remote employees’ situation. 
In practice though, the rest 20% which might not be properly assessed, might impose 
cyber risks that could directly or indirectly damage the organization if exploited. As an 
example, an asset in Equinor’s case study (e.g. an offshore platform) might be left out 
of scope because everyone assumes that it is not exposed in any way. However, if this 
asset is connected with others, not exposed up to that date, and the risk owner(s) decide 
to make them available through the internet, the asset that was left out of scope, is now 
indirectly affected and may be compromised during a cyber security incident. 
Another disadvantage is in relation to complexity, since Octave Allegro is known to 
produce significant amount of documentation, which can lead to unwanted delays while 
trying to evaluate the documentation data. As with the previous standards that have 
been reviewed in this section, time might be a significant factor if the organization is to 
identify cyber threats for solutions that are already exposed. Lastly, it should be 
emphasized that Octave Allegro is known to be heavily dependent on subjectivity, 
meaning that the risk analysis participants (analysts, decision-makers, operational 
experts and other relevant stakeholders) might have a subjective opinion on certain 




Can be time efficient Can be time consuming 
Focus on important / related assets only Complexity  
COVID-19 community-based data Might miss important assets 
 Subjectivity dependent 
 Uncertainty 
 
Table 6 – Octave Allegro strengths and weaknesses on dealing home office cyber 




FAIR is the only risk assessment methodology from the ones under review, which has 
a quantitative orientation. It is therefore the most likely one to produce very accurate 
results, which would be difficult to argue against during the decision-making process. 
This can be a significant advantage, especially while identifying and evaluating risks 
related to oil and gas assets that can have major consequences in human life and the 
environment if they are compromised due them being exposed to the internet. 
Moreover, since FAIR is not a complete risk assessment framework, it can be integrated 
and used parallelly with others. Organizations could therefore use qualitative methods 
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for getting faster results on the solutions they expose to the internet and use FAIR as a 
follow up (or in parallel) for more accurate estimations regarding assets that may be 
harder to make decisions for. Another advantage is the popularity of FAIR since it is 
used from 45% of the Fortune 1000. This means that there are many relevant case 
studies or peers the risk practitioners can investigate, and it may not be a major 
challenge of the oil and gas organization using FAIR wants to expand the risk analysts 
team with experienced and competent personnel. 
On the other hand, if an oil and gas company is to use FAIR as the only methodology, 
there are some concerns that need to be highlighted. To start off, it can be time 
consuming since it is quantitative, therefore the organization might be at risk until the 
results are available and actions / decisions are taken. Another issue is that the outcome 
of FAIR is known to be hard to follow, therefore not all involved parties would be able 
to absorb the result in an efficient way. This may lead to problematic decision-making 
as well. FAIR is heavily dependent on proper and accurate input / metrics, therefore, if 
the risk analysts do not have that, the result might be flawed. 
FAIR 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Solid results help on decision-making Time consuming 
COVID-19 community-based data Organization may be at risk due to time 
needed  
Can be used in parallel, or as part of 
other methodologies 
Results hard to understand 
Easier to increase risk analysts’ 
personnel due to popularity 
Uncertainty 
 
Table 7 – FAIR strengths and weaknesses on dealing home office cyber risks (oil & 




NIST SP800-30 demonstrates its effective systematic methodology as one of its 
strongest points. This can help risk analysts working in the oil and gas industry on 
producing reliable and valid results. It also enables decision-makers on making proper 
decisions with regards to cyber risks relevant to remote working solutions / projects 
that have been exposed already. Furthermore, just as IRAM2, NIST SP800-30 uses a 
common language framework. Data is easily understandable across risk analysts, 
decision-makers, and other stakeholders with different background (business/finance 
oriented, IT, drilling, offshore operational experts). Another advantage that needs to be 
highlighted is that NIST SP800-30 is “Core IT infrastructure” oriented. Oil and gas 
companies are still using legacy core IT infrastructure designs due to the nature of the 
applications which are relevant to the industry, as well as their decision to keep some 
of those applications isolated from the rest of the organization’s core network, and the 
internet for security reasons. Therefore, NIST SP800-30 seems to be tailored for 
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companies that rely on legacy core IT infrastructure designs and prefer to keep several 
services within their own data centers rather than moving them to the Cloud. 
On the other hand, risk analysts working for oil and gas organizations need consider 
the fact that NIST SP800-30 is known to be a complex model, and just as ISO 
27005:2018, it does not have specific metrics defined. Therefore, from a procedural 
perspective, depending on the use-case, it may be hard to follow especially for decision-
makers or stakeholders that do not have a risk science background / experience. Another 
important observation is that the NIST SP800-30 standard has a high IT orientation, 
and it may not be possible to consider or value non-IT factors. This can be an issue for 
oil and gas organizations since for example human life and environmental impact, are 
assets that can prove to take into account.  Another factor that should be reflected upon, 
is the core IT infrastructure orientation potential unsuitability if some of the services in 
scope are cloud based. NIST SP800-30 has not been recently revised and may therefore 
have flaws while assessing risks for cloud-based services. This could lead into potential 
misses, which endanger the company’s assets. Equinor’s case study reveals that oil and 
gas organizations have chosen to move several services to the cloud. Therefore, risk 
analysts that consider using SP800-30 for evaluating cyber risks for the oil and gas 
industry, need to evaluate if the modern “Hybrid” model (Core IT Infrastructure + 




Effective systematic methodology Complexity 
Common language framework Organization may be at risk due to time 
needed  
Understandable output Results hard to understand 
Core IT infrastructure oriented May be unsuitable for Hybrid or Cloud 
IT Infrastructure models 
 Uncertainty 
 
Table 8 – NIST SP800-30 strengths and weaknesses on dealing home office cyber 














An important factor that needs to be considered retrospectively for determining the 
effectiveness of the pre-selected risk assessments for the home office reality in the oil 
and gas industry, is time. Companies had a limited timespan for assessing cyber risks 
properly, therefore, none of the risk assessment methodologies would be effective, 
unless there was relevant past data that could speed up the process. Based on Equinor’s 
case study, decision-makers, top managers, risk owners, operational experts, and other 
stakeholders, acted within a few days with an end-goal of building a business continuity 
plan based on working from home, while the risks were assessed on the fly. Due to this, 
as a continuation, organizations would have to conduct full risk assessments for each 
of the developed solutions, while time has again a significant importance, since 
solutions were already exposed to the internet without having the full risk picture before 
exposing them. Equinor’s story verifies this finding, as there were some minor misses, 
most of which were followed up and resolved from the risk analysts and cyber security 
operational experts. 
Due to the rationality of introducing and expanding remote work solutions, follow-up 
risk assessments would be needed. IRAM2, Octave Allegro and NIST SP800-30 could 
produce a faster outcome, which would help organizations on securing their home 
office solutions from potential risks that were not identified prior to introducing them. 
ISO 27005:2018 could also prove time effective, depending on how the risk analysts 
choose to tailor the solution and its metrics. FAIR would be more challenging since it 
is quantitative, therefore, it would most likely take more time for conducting an 
assessment based on that methodology. This implies that the company would be at risk 
for a greater period, until the output is available, and actions are taken. It could be used 
though for relevant projects / solutions, where a qualitative risk analysis result would 
not be sufficient for decision-makers and they would require stronger, objective output 
before taking decisions. 
Moreover, there are important findings worth highlighting from a risk analysts / 
decision-makers / stakeholders perspective, which are applicable on a broader scale, 
meaning that they are valid, in scenarios where companies would have a much larger 
time span to react upon and do proper planning both for developing remote work 
solutions, as well as for conducting relevant risk assessments. IRAM2 can offer a 
complete risk lifecycle to risk analysts, including a risk treatment phase. It also has a 
strong business orientation, something which can be highly appreciated by decision 
makers and/or risk owners in oil and gas organizations with a business background, 
since it usually helps them produce quality decision-making results. An extra asset is 
the common language, which enhances risk communication. A potential impediment 
can be complexity, as it is not an easy methodology to conduct and follow, and it 
requires highly experienced and competent risk analysts. If there is a sudden high-




ISO 27005:2018 is the biggest question mark of this research, since its high 
customization / tailoring capabilities can prove to be both an asset, as well as an 
impediment. However, in principle, it can prove very useful for oil and gas 
organizations, since it relies on human factor and responsibility, which are attributes 
highly appreciated in that industry. It can also integrate both quantitative and qualitative 
methodologies, providing one common framework to risk analysts which can be used 
in almost any use-case / project. 
Octave Allegro’s characteristics can help companies get results relatively fast, which is 
a benefit in situations where results are needed in haste, however an important weakness 
is that it can be complex as a method, and more importantly, it can miss or misjudge 
the value of specific assets, hence exposing the company to potential risks with an 
unknown impact. This is very important for oil and gas organizations, where human 
life and the environment are at stake from a potential cybersecurity incident. Another 
important factor is that Octave Allegro relies heavily on the subjectivity of the 
participants, which could produce unsafe results depending on their competence, as 
well as their view and understanding of certain attributes. 
FAIR’s strongest advantage is that the results it produces are hard to question, therefore, 
it makes a decision-maker’s life a lot easier, which can prove important in the home 
office / oil and gas industry use-case. On the other hand, besides the time factor that has 
already been mentioned, the results can sometimes be difficult or complex to 
understand properly. 
NIST SP800-30 is perhaps the most IT-oriented methodology, and that comes with 
advantages. The output can be easily understood, from IT-oriented stakeholders / 
experts, and it uses a core-IT infrastructure orientation, which appears to be close to the 
legacy IT infrastructure designs that oil & gas companies have. It also uses a common 
language framework that can be understood across the relevant stakeholders, and it has 
an effective and systematic orientation. However, it may introduce challenges as well, 
since it can be complex, and the results can be difficult to understand for decision-
makers and stakeholders without a technical background. Moreover, the risk analysts 
and operational experts need to evaluate its suitability against more modern IT models, 
such as the “Hybrid” ones which combine legacy designs with Cloud IAAS 
(Infrastructure as a Service). 
Furthermore, some findings need to be emphasized in terms of reliability and validity 
as well. On a general basis, qualitative methodologies are quite dependent on the 
subjectivity of the participants, therefore, results produced by them can be questionable. 
As an example, an organization might use two teams consisting of risks analysis / 
decision-makers / stakeholders for assessing the risk of exposing a solution to the 
internet for operating an offshore platform remotely. According to a cyber security 
expert who is part of the first team, the likelihood of having a remote client 
compromised by an attacker is 0,1%, however, another operational expert on the second 
team considers 0,01% as a more proper probability metric. This is subjective in both 
cases, and if risk analysts consider the same impact score for both cases, the first time 
will produce a risk score which is ten times higher compared to the one produced from 
the second team. Therefore, there is no reliability on the results, and some (if not all) 
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may be invalid as well. IRAM2, Octave Allegro and NIST SP800-30 (ISO 27005:2018 
as well depending on its customization) could potentially be vulnerable to this issue due 
to their qualitative nature. On the other hand, a quantitative approach such as FAIR, 
can also introduce challenges, since it may be difficult to characterize and deal with 
risk and uncertainties (Aven, 2020, p. 85). However, it would most likely produce 
reliable and valid results, because its much less dependent on subjectivity. A pure 
quantitative methodology though can be all about numbers, which is also problematic 
according to Aven, since risk cannot be characterized and expressed solely by numbers 
and the results might be difficult to follow (Aven, 2020, p. 84). 
Another finding is related to the importance of relevant data a company would possess 
prior to the home office implementation. Such input could drastically reduce the input 
needed from experts for developing such projects and dealing with the generated risk. 
Equinor was fortunate to have data from the home office implementation for Beijing 
users, which was a few days in advance. This action provided important insight on 
potential issues and risks that would be faced while extending the remote employees 
scenario on a global scale. Other organizations built similar solutions in a smaller time 
span, without having a previous experience. Another scenario would be companies that 
have done a past case study / simulation, where all employees would work remotely 
due to a threat of a different nature. Such simulation could provide important insight on 




If a time constrain is to be considered for a similar use-case in the future, a logical 
approach would be to do a rational evaluation of the existing data and examine the 
possibility of re-using information from past risk assessments that are related. If an IT 
solution is already exposed, it most probably implies that the decision was made in 
accordance to governing rules, risk assessment findings and relevant follow-up actions. 
Past risk assessment input that can be used for producing rapid results by using the five 
methodologies examined, can be an option, however, not a likely one if the available 
period is a few days only. 
In such rational situations, risk assessment methodologies that could prove more 
suitable would be the rapid risk assessments (RRA). A rapid risk assessment can take 
hours or in certain cases minutes to complete. RRA is not a full risk / vulnerability 
assessment methodology, but rather a high-level one. Its main objective is to estimate 
the value and impact of a specific service to the reputation, finances and the productivity 
of the project or business in scope. It is suitable for such circumstances because of its 
speed, and its simplistic nature, therefore it can be easily understood by the involved 
parties (Mozilla, n.d.). The main weakness of RRAs, is that they can often produce 
invalid measurements and invalid results / outcomes, due to their rational nature. 
A logical approach in hasty use-cases would be to use RRAs for a quick analysis of the 
cyber risks related to home office, expose the solutions needed for business continuity, 
and then use a full risk assessment methodology that normally produces results within 
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a few weeks, for re-assessing each of the solutions that were made available on the 
internet. This approach seems to be the one followed from Equinor also, since the 
solutions were swiftly re-examined after their initial introduction. 
From a risk assessment perspective, it would be hard to recommend one methodology 
only for rational use-cases, since it would seem more proper to use at least two, if not 
three under such scenarios. RRA seems more fit for the initial pre-service-publishing 
phase. IRAM2, NIST SP800-30 and ISO 27005:2018 (under specific circumstances) 
seem more suitable for re-assessing these services after their initial exposure. FAIR can 
be used if decision-makers need more solid results which are harder to question before 
taking actions related to a specific “Work from Home” service. Therefore, a “One 
solution that fits all” option, may not be the best one for the cyber risks’ analysis related 
to the home office implementation from oil & gas organizations. Aven also has a similar 
suggestion, indicating that there are considerable limitations by using exclusively pure 
qualitative or quantitative methodologies, and he further suggests that a combined 
quantitative/qualitative approach can be a better option as it merges the strengths of 
both worlds and it minimizes their weaknesses (Aven, 2020, pp. 84-85). 
On the other hand, if a company has much more time to react upon, all five 
methodologies can prove useful, but some seem more suitable against others. There are 
only a few limitations that have been identified for IRAM2, and FAIR, that should be 
considered. NIST SP800-30 has the extra limitation of not being able to value certain 
non-technical assets, such as human life, which may prove more challenging for oil & 
gas organizations. ISO 27005:2018 can be effective, but this highly depends on how 
the risks analysts customize it. Octave Allegro on the other hand, has one limitation that 
needs to be seriously considered, and that is the Pareto’s law approach. Petroleum 
companies seem to have a strong emphasis on evaluating all their assets properly, 
therefore this methodology may prove inefficient due to potential misses. Therefore, 
ideally risk analysts could follow a qualitative approach by using IRAM2, ISO 
27005:2018 or NIST SP800-30, and utilize quantitative techniques such as FAIR if a 
stronger, objective results is required from the decision-makers and extended time is 
available. 
Another obvious suggestion is to conduct simulations of similar crisis scenarios. 
Companies can develop business continuity plans, pre-designed IT solutions and pre-
conducted cyber security risk assessments, have them on stand-by, and review them 
periodically. This could be done for example for a scenario of a complete company 
offices lockdown, which would imply that personnel required to have a physical 
presence in the corporate network for operating critical offshore or drilling solutions, 
would not be allowed to do so, therefore only home office would be applicable even for 
such critical tasks. 
Even though the technical part is relatively out of scope for this thesis, it is worth 
highlighting some elements that could prove valuable while implementing large-scale 
home office solutions. Based on Equinor’s study, an easy approach is to extend existing 
remote users’ solutions as much as possible, since they are already exposed, and 
relevant risk assessments have been conducted in the past prior to exposing them. Cloud 
migrations can also be an asset, since some of the key advantages of such services is 
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scalability and business continuity implementation with minimal effort, (Queensland 
Government, n.d.). An important ingredient towards a successful and swift home office 
implementation can be company-owned and managed devices such as laptops, since 
the organization can apply strict security policies and have a good insight on security 
events generated from these devices. 
Based on the thesis findings, a generic pattern can be suggested depending on the time 
availability, as well as the characteristics and complexity of an industry and/or a project 
in scope. For example, oil and gas companies tend to often perform exhaustive risk 
assessment techniques since human life, as well as the environment is at stake. The 
same cannot be assumed for other industries, such as retail. There are common 
observations though, regardless of the complexity of the business area or the project. If 
time is limited, only RRAs are applicable. For a relatively average time availability, 
qualitative methods can be used. However, as the timespan grows, companies should 
consider using a mix of qualitative/quantitative techniques, which can be most effective 
for more challenging tasks. The following figure demonstrates the generic pattern 
mentioned above: 
 
Figure 13 – Suggested risk assessment methodologies depending on time availability 






8.3. Future research 
 
Research on this thesis can be further expanded in multiple angles. The obvious one is 
to include more risk assessment methodologies, providing a holistic review that could 
assist risk analysts on understanding specific strengths and weaknesses for each, while 
using them as tools for conducting cyber security risks assessments related to home 
office for the oil and gas industry. 
The study field can also be expanded to focus on home office in general, however this 
can prove quite challenging since there are different characteristics for each industry. 
Retail for example is mostly related to business-to-client or business-to-business 
shopping/sales, therefore the potential impact from cyber security risks is very different. 
That implies that there might be different strengths or challenges that risks analysts, 
decision-makers and stakeholders need to consider while using the five risk assessment 
methodologies included in this thesis. 
Another consideration is having the vendors / creators of those methods, reviewing, and 
evolving them, releasing new versions in the market, with improvements and/or 
potential weaknesses. In such a scenario, parts of this research may not be applicable 
anymore due to the new characteristics of one or more of those methodologies.  
Finally, more relevant case studies could be included in a future research providing a 
complete picture with a bigger real-examples sample. This could potentially provide 




















There are many learnings that can be absorbed, some of which have a higher 
significance compared to others. From a risk science perspective, each method has 
generic strengths and weaknesses. Depending on the characteristics of the company and 
the industry it belongs to, some of the generic positives or negatives, may have a bigger 
or smaller impact. There are also advantages and impediments to consider when time 
is a major factor.  
For the home office situation in the oil and gas industry, it seems that the best approach 
for risk analysts would be to possess experience on at least two or more risk assessment 
types and use them accordingly depending on the use-case. A similar future incident 
that would give oil and gas companies a wider period to react upon, could potentially 
utilize one methodology only. A rational scenario would most likely utilize two or three 
different. From the investigated ones, IRAM2 and FAIR may prove a strong 
combination of one qualitative and one quantitative methodology, which should cover 
most needs. The other ones can also prove usable if the risk analyst is aware of the 
limitations they have. 
A key factor for successfully introducing new solutions and for properly following risk 
assessment methodologies, is proactiveness. This is applicable not just for the oil and 
gas industry, but for any business sector in general. Identifying cyber threat scenarios, 
simulating network breaches, examining the possibility of a scenario that would not 
allow employees to reach the corporate offices (for example environmentalists blocking 
entrance to all office locations for an oil and gas company), building business continuity 
and risk treatment plans, are things that can provide valuable data, which may prove 
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Appendix I – Interview questionnaire 
 
Questions on the risk assessment methodologies 
 
1. Which risk assessment method(s) are you using for analyzing cyber security 
threats? 
2. Is the risk assessment method(s) used as-is, or has it been customized to fit your 
company’s needs? If so, please provide a brief description of these 
customizations. 
3. How often does the company evaluate whether the selected risk assessment 
model(s) is efficient enough? 
4. Please outline strengths and weaknesses that have been experienced with the 
risk assessment models that have been utilized by your company to the date. 
5. Does the company have one common risk analysis team for evaluating cyber 
security risks / threats related to remote working, or are there multiple teams? 
6. If there are multiple teams, are they all using the same risk assessment model or 
do they use different ones? 
 
Questions on risk assessments, emergency plans and/or business continuity plans, 
related to COVID-19 “Home Office” and cyber security 
 
1. Has a risk Assessment been done in the past, for evaluating potential cyber 
security risks related to home office? If so, was the case of having most 
employees working from home included in the pre-defined scenarios? 
2. If the scenario of having most employees working remotely was investigated, 
was a risk treatment plan also implemented? 
3. Did the company’s emergency plan / business continuity plan investigate the 
shift to remote working and to what extent? 
4. Was a risk assessment done after the COVID-19 outbreak, before introducing 
“Home Office” for the company’s employees? 
 
Questions related to the “Home Office” situation 
 
1. Was the company’s IT infrastructure prepared and equipped to handle the global 
“Work from Home” situation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic? 
2. What is the percentage of the company’s personnel that works using remote 
solutions? 




4. Please provide a high overview of the IT crisis response team (participants, 
business areas etc.) 
5. Were the activities relevant to the sudden and large-scale shift to remote 
working executed as planned, or were there any challenges? If so, how were 
they dealt with?  
6. Does the company conduct follow-up risk assessments for potentially 
identifying new threats and risks that might emerge during the “Work from 
Home” period? If so, how often? 
 
Questions related to cyber security in the oil and gas industry 
 
1. Please outline cyber security risks / threats which are relevant and unique for 
the oil and gas industry. 
2. Are there any tasks related to the oil and gas industry, that generate a high cyber 
security risk / threat, if they are to be conducted remotely from home? Please 
describe a number such tasks along with a brief explanation of the potential 
impact in case of an incident, and mitigating actions for reducing the overall 
risk score of these threats. 
3. Does your company utilize cyber security / cyber defense technologies which 
are tailored for the oil and gas industry? 
4. How does your company gather intelligence / information related to potential 
Cyber threats? 
5. What is the company’s strategy for cyber security and Working from Home 
going forward? Does the strategy include plans for allowing remote work even 
for traditional tasks that would normally require an on-site presence of the 
employee? 
 
